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ABSTRACT
In the fall of 1864, Brigadier General James H. Carleton sent Kit Carson and
about four hundred men on a punitive campaign against the Kiowa and Comanche
Indians of the high plains. The resulting battle was one of the largest in the history of
North American Indian Wars. Yet this conflict has been relegated to historical obscurity.
In this paper, I examine why Kit Carson’s 1864 Adobe Walls Campaign is
forgotten, I measure the success of the mission, and place it in the larger context of
nineteenth century Indian Wars, particularly those prosecuted against plains tribes.
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Introduction
Visiting Adobe Walls
A cold late Panhandle norther doubled over the yellow grass. I squinted against
its chilling force as I stepped out of my truck and into the bottoms on the north side of the
Canadian River. A twelve-mile trek off State Highway 207 had taken me to the site of
the Adobe Walls fight. Not much remains. Were it not for fingerboards pointing the way
and a few markers placed by the Panhandle-Plains Historical Society, I would never have
found the site. A gate impedes travel beyond a wide spot between the barbed wire on a
caliche road near the Turkey Track Ranch headquarters. Miles of empty prairie surround
Adobe Walls. Hours later, as I departed, an inbound driver stopped me to ask whether he
was on the right road.
Not many people know that two important battles were fought at Adobe Walls. I
made this first trip to the battle site after becoming interested in Christopher “Kit”
Carson’s last fight, the Battle of Adobe Walls of 1864. This battle featured Carson, 335
New Mexico and California volunteers, and 75 Utes taking on well over a thousand
Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa-Apache (or “Plains Apache”) warriors. Department of
New Mexico commander General James H. Carleton sent Carson’s force to strike a
punitive blow against the Kiowa and Comanche. Thier raids on the Santa Fe Trail
threatened communications, emigration, commerce, and army logistics between New
Mexico Territory and the states. Carlton meant to open the trail, once and for all.
The Second Battle of Adobe Walls occurred in 1874. Hide hunters had
established a small community at the site of William Bent’s old trading post on the
Canadian. A group of less than thirty of them held off an attack by over seven hundred
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Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes led by Quanah Parker and Isa-tai. Indians snuck up
on the hide hunters in the early dawn. After inflicting a few casualties in the initial early
morning raid, the Indians settled in for a siege. On the second day of the conflict, the
famous scout Billy Dixon reputedly shot an Indian off of his horse at a range of nearly a
mile. This extraordinary shot startled and discouraged the Indians, who then melted
away.
On my arrival at the battlefield, I spent an hour traipsing around the site and
reading the markers. One marker lists participants thought to have taken part in the 1874
fight on the side of the hide hunters. Another monument of equal prominence notes the
Native Americans known to have lost their lives in the battle. One stone honors Billy
Dixon, who lived until 1913 and was buried at Texline. Dixon’s widow had his remains
exhumed and reinterred at Adobe Walls. Markers pay homage to the four casualties from
the party of hide hunters.
There are no walls at Adobe Walls – at the site or in the distance. The markers
are about the only cultural geography. I found the perimeter of one building after a
thorough search. Nothing remains of the hide hunters’ village. No pump-jacks, pivot
sprinklers, or buildings pollute the view. Dry grass climbs the steep slopes toward the
caprock. Isolated trees mark the location of water. It seems the only colors left on God’s
palate when painting that part of the Canadian Valley were powder blue and dry gold,
with just a dot of green here and there. Most visitors would not call the scenery
“beautiful,” but it has a subtle, lonely allure.
I pondered the Panhandle-Plains Historical Society’s presentation of the site as I
wandered the grounds. I found it strange that every existing marker commemorated the
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1874 battle. The Second Battle of Adobe Walls triggered the Red River War. It sparked
a response that would end the reign of the Comanches, who had earned the moniker,
“Lords of the South Plains.” At the close of the war, federal authorities removed the
remaining Southern Plains tribes to Indian Territory. It makes sense that the PanhandlePlains Historical Society would commemorate that significant event. The main original
marker emphasizes the valiant defense of the few against the many. Locals who know
something of Adobe Walls usually remember it for “the shot.”
But what about the much larger 1864 fight with its intriguing characters and ties
to so many other elements of nineteenth-century American frontier and military history?
That battle has ties to the Civil War, other Indian War campaigns, the implementation of
total war, and the winter campaign as a major army tactic against the Plains tribes. The
first campaign featured Kit Carson, Satanta, dueling prairie fires, mountain howitzers,
and Indians blowing bugle calls to confuse Carson’s troops. In the 1864 battle, thousands
of Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa-Apaches streamed from their lodges to send Carson
and company back to New Mexico. Only a heroic extrication saved Carson’s command
from the fate that met the Seventh Cavalry at Little Bighorn twelve years later. One
would never know this earlier, larger fight took place at Adobe Walls by reading the
monuments.1
Why has history bypassed this battle? The 1864 Battle of Adobe Walls was one
of the largest single Indian War battles fought on the North American continent. This
historical omission cannot be due to a lack of military action. Carson’s almost
1

Part of this disparity of recognition comes from the fact that the site memorialized by the PanhandlePlains Historical Society was the site of the 1874 battle. The 1864 battle took place just over a mile from
the site, but is on inaccessible private land, now pt. of the Turkey Track Ranch. The fact that the PPHS
negotiated with the ranch to make the 1874 site accessible and place markers there, but did not do so for the
1864 site is a direct statement about which fight was considered more important.
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miraculous extraction of his force, saving his party the dubious distinction that later befell
Custer, surely compares to Billy Dixon’s legendary long-distance marksmanship in 1874.
It cannot be due to a difference in star power among the participants. Satanta and
Dohasan (1864) might be slightly less recognizable to many than Isa-tai and Quanah
Parker (1874), but Kit Carson (1864) – maligned though he now is in some circles – is
clearly a more recognizable hero than Billy Dixon or Bat Masterson (1874).

Monument to Comanche and Cheyenne Casualties in 1874 Adobe Walls Fight with the
Dry Texas Plains in the Background. Photograph by Barclay Gibson, December, 2008,
in Adobe Walls, TX. http://www.texasescapes.com/TexasPanhancleTowns/AdobeWalls-Texas.htm#battle (accessed 26 June 2010).

Marker for Scout and Medal of Honor Winner Billy Dixon. His remains are interred at
the Adobe Walls site. Photograph by Barclay Gibson, December, 2008, in Adobe Walls,
TX. http://www.texasescapes.com/TexasPanhancleTowns/Adobe-WallsTexas.htm#battle (accessed 26 June 2010).
4

A close up of the Comanche and Cheyenne Marker. Photograph by Barclay Gibson,
December, 2008, in Adobe Walls, TX.
http://www.texasescapes.com/TexasPanhancleTowns/Adobe-Walls-Texas.htm#battle
(accessed 26 June 2010).
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Marker Noting the Hide Hunter Participants in the 1874 Fight. Photograph by Barclay
Gibson, December, 2008, in Adobe Walls, TX.
http://www.texasescapes.com/TexasPanhancleTowns/Adobe-Walls-Texas.htm#battle
(accessed 26 June 2010).
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Success often shapes the perception of historical events. The 1874 battle has
always been seen as a victory for the hide hunters and part of American conquest of the
West.2 Although there has been debate on the matter, historians generally consider the
1864 battle a defeat for the army. 3 In this paper, I argue that this perception of the 1864
battle as a failure – or at least confusion over the objectives and achievement of those
objectives – has relegated that conflict and its participants to an undeserved erasure from
the remembered past.
In order to evaluate meaningfully the success or failure of any military operation,
one must understand the objectives of the venture. Historians who have debated the
success of the 1864 Adobe Walls campaign have not always agreed on a standard by
which that success ought to have been measured. That struggle to come to terms with
how the 1864 Adobe Walls campaign should be evaluated has caused confusion over the
battle’s significance and aided in relegating the conflict to obscurity. I plan to examine
the factors that came to determine success in a campaign against Plains Indians during
this era. I will examine the objectives set forth by government and military officials prior
to the 1864 campaign and then reexamine the success of the campaign based on those
objectives.

2

T. Linday Baker and Billy R. Harrison. Adobe Walls: The History and Archeology of the 1874 Trading
Post (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 93-109; Wilbur S. Nye, Carbine &
Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1943), 190-191; Frederick W.
Rathjen, The Texas Panhandle Frontier, (1973; reprint, Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1998),
130-131.
3
Rathjen, Texas Panhandle Frontier, 80; Utley, Kit Carson and the Adobe Walls Campaign, 4; Robert M.
Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865, (Lincoln, University of
Nebraska Press, 1967), 299; Charles L. Kenner, The Comanchero Frontier: A History of New MexicoPlains Indian Relations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969; reprint Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1994), 148-150 (page citations are to the reprint edition); Dunlay, Kit Carson & the
Indians, 334-337; Nye, Carbine & Lance, 37; Wilbur S. Nye, Bad Medicine & Good: Tales the Kiowas,
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), xv; Edward L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days1809-1868, Vol. 2.
(1935; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 746-748; Mildred P. Mayhall, The Kiowas
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), 232; Wallace and Hoebel, The Comanches, 306.
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Success ought not be the only measure by which historians judge the significance
of past military conflicts. Clearing up the question of success, what defines success, and
whether or not this particular conflict should be considered successful will allow us to
move beyond that issue to examine other important features of this dramatic clash.
I will examine the strategy and tactics utilized by the army in the 1864 Adobe
Walls campaign. I will compare those to strategy and tactics used in previous and
subsequent campaigns. Doing so enables meaningful comparison to other engagements
with Plains tribes and places the battle in the larger context of the mid-nineteenth century
Indian Wars. I plan to show what influence the execution of this campaign had on the
prosecution of other army objectives on the plains over the next few decades.
Understanding the objectives of Carleton’s and Carson’s 1864 campaign against
the Comanches and Kiowas will help determine the success of that enterprise. Clearing
up that point of contention will allow a more effective evaluation of the conflict’s
importance. Comparing this battle with others of the era against the plains tribes will
show the importance of forgotten, but significant and fascinating campaign. This
massive Battle of Adobe Walls fought in 1864 truly does deserves a more prominent
place in American history.

8

1. The Situation in New Mexico and the Southern Plains
New Mexico and the Civil War
In the summer of 1864, Americans were embroiled in the Civil War. Despite the
expanse of geography separating New Mexico from the great campaigns in the East, the
Civil War remained a major concern for New Mexicans with ties to the states. Turmoil
confronted New Mexicans from the outset of the war. Southern New Mexico had
Confederate leanings. Confederate sympathizers held a secession convention at Mesilla
in March of 1861. The convention voted to establish a Confederate Arizona Territory
composed of the southern portions of present-day Arizona and New Mexico. A
convention met later in the year in Tucson and adopted the recommendations of the
Mesilla convention. Confederate sympathizers constituted a political majority in
southern New Mexico.1
Confederates threatened Union control of New Mexico with more than just
political rhetoric. Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley led a Confederate invasion force of
about four regiments of Texans from San Antonio through most settled portions of New
Mexico Territory in late winter and early spring 1862. The Texans operated up the Rio
Grande Valley with considerable success. They won a series of tactical victories and
advanced beyond the territorial capital, Santa Fe. At the Battle of Glorieta Pass, Sibley’s
Texans were in the midst of another tactical victory. As the Confederates drove Union
forces out of the canyon, Major John Chivington, a Methodist preacher turned Union
soldier, found the Confederate supply wagons lightly guarded. Chivington’s force
plundered the wagons, fired what remained, and killed or captured over five hundred
1

Donald S. Frazier, Blood and Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 1995), 34; Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: a Territorial
History rev ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 97-102.
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Confederate horses and mules. By destroying the Confederate supply train, the New
Mexico and Colorado volunteers sent the now destitute Texans on a long, hungry march
down the Rio Grande Valley back toward San Antonio.2
Surely in the summer of 1864, Brigadier General James H. Carleton remembered
how the loss of this single Confederate supply train had crippled the Confederate
invaders in back in March of 1862. Carleton faced Indian threats to his own supply line
with the states. Perhaps the memory of those starving Texans marching back to San
Antonio from northern New Mexico helped convince Carleton to take action against the
Indians of the Southern Plains when they began plundering his supply trains on the Santa
Fe Trail in 1864.
Many Hispanic New Mexicans probably associated the Confederate cause with
Texas and Texans. Most New Mexicans outside the southern settlements had likely
never met any Confederate sympathizers who were not Texans. Texas troops made up
Sibley’s invasion force. This association takes on greater significance considering the
traditional New Mexican dislike and mistrust of Texans. Texas Governor Mirabeau B.
Lamar had sent an invading force west from the Austin area toward Santa Fe in 1841
intent on asserting Texas sovereignty on lands that had not historically been part of
Texas, but were claimed by Texas after its independence in 1836. The mission was a
completed disaster for the Texans. New Mexico Governor Manuel Armijo captured the

2

For and extensive discussion of the New Mexico campaign, see Frazier, Blood and Treasure. See also,
John P. Wilson, When the Texans Came: Missing Records From the Civil War in the Southwest
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001); John Taylor, Bloody Valverde: A Civil War Battle
on the Rio Grande, February 21, 1862 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Thomas
Edrington and John Taylor, The Battle of Glorieta Pass: A Gettysburg in the West, March 26-28, 1862
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000).
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vulnerable party.3 Even so, memories of that affair agitated the ill will. Some New
Mexican mothers even threatened their children with the ultimatum, “If you don’t
behave, I’ll sell you to the Tejanos.”4
The Confederate invasion from Texas exacerbated a traditional New Mexican illwill toward Texans. These agitating factors explain why Union sympathizing New
Mexicans remained on edge throughout the war. This uneasiness also affected the way
Anglo New Mexicans perceived their Indian neighbors. It dictated shifts in the
interactions between New Mexicans and Indians in the Rio Grande Valley and on the
Southern Plains during the Civil War.
New Mexico’s Relationship with Comanches and Kiowas
Many long-time New Mexico residents considered the Comanches friendly.
Comanches were a valuable link in the regional economy, frequently raiding the Texas
frontier to capture livestock, goods, and prisoners. Comancheros – Mexican traders –
then made their way from New Mexico onto the plains to acquire the stolen goods. The
Comancheros hauled the trappings back to New Mexico, where they profited by selling
the inexpensive merchandise and stock to Rio Grande Valley residents. New Mexicans
benefited directly from the availability of the low priced goods and livestock.5 Of course,
the Comanches gained most from the relationship. Comanche scholar Pekka Hämäläinen
even argues that through this powerful economic, political, and military empire the
Comaches had established a colony in reverse, with the tribe exploiting Euroamerican

3

Joseph M. Nance. After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1963), 504-507.
4
Kenner, The Comanchero Frontier, 171.
5
For a detailed discussion of the relationship, see Kenner, Comanchero Frontier.
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settlers.6 Whether the Comanche position was that dominant is unclear, but all parties
involved in the exchange benefited financially from the Comanche trade. The hated
Texans were the only victims in the arrangement, and New Mexicans were fighting a war
against them.
The relationship between New Mexicans and the Kiowas is not so clear. Kiowas
tended to keep to the plains. They interacted less with New Mexicans than did the
Comanches. Far less historical evidence therefore remains to explain this tribe’s
relationship to New Mexicans.
Government and the Indians
U.S. Indian policy underwent a shift in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1820’s,
American statesmen believed the country had more land that it could ever fill with EuroAmericans. The administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams adopted a
policy placing Indians beyond a “permanent Indian frontier” on land they did not think
whites would ever want or need. As the population grew, and Euro-Americans moved
toward the Pacific, U.S. policy shifted to finding ways to eliminate Indian land claims.
They attempted to move Indians onto reservations, teach them agriculture, and assimilate
them into American culture. This obviously put the government at odds with native
peoples on a more regular basis.7
Shifting U.S. policies and administrations caused confusion. One of the most
troublesome changes came just after the close of the Mexican-American War. In 1849,
Congress created a new cabinet-level department, the Department of the Interior. Prior to
6

Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 1-9.
Durwood Ball, Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848-1861 (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2001), 13-15. For comprehensive history of U.S. Indian Policy, see Francis P. Prucha, The Great
Father: The Unites States Government and the American Indians (1984; reprint, Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1995).
7
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this, Indian affairs had been overseen by a bureau housed in the War Department. Now
the new Interior Department took over the responsibility. At first, the change seemed
benign. BIA officials simply reported to a different civilian cabinet official. The
different chains of administrative authority would eventually cause seriously strained
relationships within the government, and often resulted in dissonant policies applied by
the army and Indian Affairs.8 These problems would fester and eventually cause acute
disagreement in New Mexico.
Both the Union and Confederate sides of the Civil War initially approached
Indians to enlist them in their causes. During the early stages of the war, neither side
aggressively pursued alliances with Native American tribes. But both groups sought
mutual nonaggression agreements. Both saw Indians as a potential source of information
about enemy movements and whereabouts.9
Union commanders in New Mexico knew that any potential invasion force from
Texas would have to come along one of two routes. New Mexico and West Texas were
always arid. The 1860s were especially dry.10 The Texans would have to follow a river,
either invading along the Rio Grande as they did in 1862, or marching across the plains
via the Pecos or Canadian River Valleys.
With the anxious mood in New Mexico, Union military officials in that
department looked to Indians on the region’s eastern frontier for intelligence about enemy
activity along the Canadian and Pecos rivers. Military leaders viewed Indians with

8

Ball, Army Regulars, 13-15; Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier, 1846-1890 rev. ed. (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 27-64.
9
Kenner, Comanchero Frontier, 138-9.
10
Elliott West, The Way to the West: Essays on the Central Plains (Albuquerque, University of New
Mexico Press, 1995), 79-82.
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caution but still wanted to exploit their ability to ride over the vast expanses Federal
troops and territorial volunteers could not patrol.
Department of New Mexico commander Colonel Edward R. S. Canby sought to
improve relations with the Kiowas for just that reason. In late 1861, troops near Hatch’s
Ranch in eastern New Mexico apprehended a party of Kiowas. Colonel Canby ordered
District of the Pecos commander Colonel J. G. Gallegos to release the captured Indians.
According to Canby, Kiowas were considered friendly as a result of the 1861 Fort Wise
Treaty. (The treaty was in fact between the United States and several Southern Cheyenne
and Arapahoe chiefs). Canby ordered Gallegos to advise the Kiowas to steer clear of
settlements unless they were invited by an army officer or Indian agent. The army
advised against Kiowa participation in the war against the Texan, but entreated them to
communicate any information they gathered regarding Texan movements across the
plains.11
There is no evidence that Plains tribes ever yielded accurate information
regarding the movement of Texas troops on the plains. Some Indians gave the
appearance of cooperation. They were either attempting to supply information in good
faith or were providing false information in hopes of garnering favor and presents. On
several occasions, Indians reported Texan movements far onto the plains or up the river
valleys.12 Confederate forces never mustered anything close to an invasion attempt along
that route. But Indians being pursued or tailed by Texans could have mistaken such

11

Lt Hugh Nicodemus to Col J.G. Gallegos, 19 December 1861, vol. 7, Letters Sent, Deptartment of New
Mexico, roll 2, microfilm, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1979) Letters Sent
by the Ninth Military Department, the Department of New Mexico, and the District of New Mexico, 18491890, Microcopy No. 1072, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group
393, Nactional Archives, Washington, D.C.
12
Kenner, Comanchero Frontier, 138-9.
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activity for a Confederate troop movement. The historical record is unclear on whether
Indians intentionally gave false information or simply misinterpreted Confederate
activity. Either way, the relationship between Union troops in New Mexico and their
Indian neighbors on the Southern Plains was not adversarial in the early years of the war.
In August 1862, Brigadier General James H. Carleton replaced Colonel Canby as
commander of the Department of New Mexico. Carleton was one of the few pre – Civil
War officers who received a commission without attending West Point. This lack of
formal training did not retard his military effectiveness or deprive him of rigidity. New
Mexicans initially lauded Carleton for his decisive pacification of the Mescalero Apaches
and Navajos between 1862 and 1864. They later deplored and repudiated his iron-fisted
implementation of martial law, which had been declared by Canby but enforced more
vigorously by Carleton. New Mexicans eventually formed an angry letter writing
campaign to Washington, D.C., in protest. Carleton masterfully employed military force
and logistics against the nation’s enemies, but in doing so, he often garnered personal
enemies of his own through his abrasive methods and personality.13
Carleton enacted a strict, no-nonsense approach to command and discipline as
well as Indian affairs, but this approach to command did not prevent him from initially
maintaining Canby’s policy of using Indians as potential spies or scouts along the eastern
frontier of New Mexico. He still viewed the Comanches as peaceful – or at least not as
enemies – as late as the summer of 1863. In June of that year, he authorized the
quartermaster at Fort Union to send a shipment to Camp Easton, near present

Arrell Morgan Gibson, “James H. Carleton” in Soldiers West, ed. Paul A. Hutton (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1987), 59-60, 70-72. See also Adam Kane, “James H. Carlton,” in Soldiers West, 2d ed.,
ed. Paul A. Hutton and L. Durwood Ball (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 122-143.
13
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Tucumcari.14 This shipment contained numerous presents and good-will tokens to be
dispersed to Comanches from Camp Easton.15
Just six months prior to Carson’s attack on the Kiowa, Comanche, and Plains
Apache villages on the Canadian River, Carleton still considered Comanche information
potentially reliable and helpful. Texans had allegedly sacked a supply train on the Santa
Fe Trail at the upper crossing of the Cimarron River, capturing eighty mules and about
ten thousand dollars. In a report on the incident, General Carlton indicated that he was
still more concerned about a Texan invasion over the plains than Indian trouble along the
Santa Fe Trail. The letter was dated June 4, 1864. Carleton still trusted the Comanches
and regarded them as relatively friendly.16 But that attitude was about to change.
Indian Trouble on the South Plains and Santa Fe Trail
The Fort Wise Treaty of 1861 confined the Cheyennes to the Sand Creek
Reservation. They struggled to survive there. Some Cheyennes and Arapahos began to
raid wagon trains in 1863. Reports indicated this outbreak would spread to a full-scale
Indian war covering the entire South Plains. In the summer of 1863, Robert North was
sent to the plains to ransom whites captured in various Indian raids. North had spent time
living among Indians and had an Arapaho wife. Upon his return in November 1863, he
reported that the Comanches, Plains Apaches, Kiowas, Arapahos, Cheyennes, and Sioux
had all allied against whites and would launch a massive war after they attained weapons.

14

Camp Easton would later be renamed Fort Bascom. It sat along the Canadian River on what is now a
private ranch.
15
Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of New Mexico Captain Ben Cutler to Captain Craig,
Quartermaster at Fort Union, 28 June 1863, vol. 9, LS, DNM, r. 3, M1072, RG 393; Cutler to
Superintendent of Indian Affairs Edgar, 28 June 1863, vol. 9, LS, DNM, r. 3, M1072, RG 393; Cutler to
Edgar, 28 June 1863, second letter, vol. 9, LS, DNM, r. 3, M1072, RG 393.
16
Carleton to Lieutenant Colonel William McMullen, 4 June 1864, vol. 10, LS, DNM, r. 3, M1072, RG
393.
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North said they would remain friendly with whites until the spring of 1864, only raiding
and plundering here and there to get arms and supplies.17
That all these tribes colluded is doubtful, but Indian raids increased in the
Southwest and along the Santa Fe Trail in 1864. Indians mounted a pair of well
coordinated attacks at Fort Larned and Walnut Creek on July 17 and 18. At Fort Larned,
a group of about seventy Comanches, Kiowas, and a few Arapahos used an altercation
between the Kiowa leader Satank and a sentry to run off the post stock. The post
commander responded by sending a party under a Lieutenant Eayre to destroy the Kiowa
lodges about three miles from the post. The Indian party anticipated Eayre’s movement
and set a trap. About two hundred Indians appeared in front of his party, but six to seven
hundred appeared to the side and behind them, in position to cut the party off from Fort
Larned. Eayre wisely maneuvered his command back to the post. As a result of the
affair, the army lost twenty-seven horses, forty-seven mules, and the entire post beef
herd. The Indians also captured sixty sutler-owned horses and mules, and a few private
cattle, all within a quarter-mile of the fort.18
Plains Indians pulled off a similar raid the next day at Walnut Creek, about thirty
miles east of Fort Larned. A group of about a hundred Indians, mostly boys, approached
a wagon train at that location. The Indians appeared friendly, but several went to the rear
of the train and began killing the teamsters. Captain O. T. Dunlap led a rescue party that
temporarily drove off the raiders, saving a few men and some of the stock. Once again, a
group of about three hundred Indians appeared in the woods along the creek in position to
isolate Captain Dunlap’s party, forcing him to return to his fortified encampment.
17

Statement of Robert North, 10 November 1863, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Hereafter abbreviated: OR), ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 4, p. 100.
18
R. M. Fish, “An Indian War,” New York Times, 7 August 1864.
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Indians killed ten teamsters in the raid, wounded three, and scalped two teenagers alive.
Whether the perpetrators were Arapahos, Comanches, Kiowas, or a mixed party remains
unclear.19
Comanches and Kiowas combined to attack the Allison wagon train on August 1,
1864. About seventy Indians entered the camp of the Allison train near Lower Cimarron
Springs, giving friendly indications. After a short period of time, they made a sudden
attack, killing all five Americans in the group and capturing the train. The Kiowas and
Comanches not only spared Mexican teamsters in the party but provided them a wagon
and one yoke of oxen for their return trip to New Mexico. The Indians stated that they
did not wish to harm the Mexicans but would kill any white man who attempted to make
passage along the road.20 Carleton cited this particular incident repeatedly as evidence
that something eventually had to be done about the Kiowa and Comanche depredations
on the Southern Plains.
The Comanches and Kiowas added several other incidents to Carleton’s mounting
evidence. On August 6, a group of about thiry Indians attacked the Zuna and Armizo
trains near Arroyo de los Plumas. Between them, Zuna and Armizo lost 135 mules.
They reported seeing a larger party of Indians driving a large herd of stock southward
toward the Canadian valley.21
About August 11, Indians attacked the George Bryant train near the upper
crossing of the Cimarron. Bryant lost all his mules. Indians killed at least two more
people while hitting a train near Cow Creek. On the twenty-first, a group of Kiowas and
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Comanches, estimated at sixty to seventy, raided a large wagon train of eighty-four
wagons near the west end of the dry branch of the Santa Fe Trail. The Indians netted 240
head of oxen and killed one wagon master. Again, witnesses from the train saw Indians
driving the captured stock off toward the Canadian valley.22
The raiders did not selectively target Union personnel, citizens, and materiel.
Kiowas and Comanches killed or captured dozens of Texans in attacks on Confederate
Fort Murray and at settlements along Elm Creek in the vicinity of present-day Graham,
Texas. Comanches struck as far south as Menard, Texas. One expert claimed
Comanches stole as many as three hundred thousand Texas cattle during the Civil War.
Although that estimate seems high, the problem was clearly severe.23
New Mexicans likely felt little sympathy over Indian raids in Texas. But all the
raids combined to illustrate an extreme shift in Indian-White relations in the region
during the summer of 1864. Fear was in the air in Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and
Kansas. One man remembered:
The summer of 1864 will long be remembered by our frontiersmen as a
season when the Comanche, the Kiowa, the Arapahoe, the Cheyenne, and
the Plain Apache held high carnival on our western plains. From early
spring to late fall, not a week went by that they didn’t commit their
depredations. . . . No trains crossed the plains that season without being
attacked, and none without strong military escorts escaped capture and
destruction. Houses and barns on the frontier were fired, stock of all kinds
was nowhere secure, large and small parties were attacked, men, women
and children murdered.24
The situation on the Plains had changed dramatically, and Union military leaders decided
that they had to take action to punish the raiders and stop the attacks.
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Why the Increase in Raiding?
Opinions diverged greatly over why raiding increased in 1864. In his book on
relations between Plains Indians and New Mexico, Charles Kenner suggests the
Comanches had become agitated at the extension of white settlement into their domain.25
This argument is overly simplistic. Comanches had more or less peaceably dealt with
Spanish and Mexican encroachment for years. They successfully established commerce
with the Mexican population of New Mexico. Why fight the whites? Anglo settlement
had been ongoing for some time. No massive influx in 1864 took place to trigger such a
downturn in relations. In theory, population increases should have provided an even
bigger market for the goods and stock Comanches captured in the Texas settlements.
Kenner also suggests that a “petty quarrel” between the army and Indian department over
sending an agent and paying for Comanche presents at Fort Bascom could have helped
trigger the deterioration.26 This event seems too small to have caused such a dramatic
shift and so much damage.
General Carleton operated under a different assumption. He knew the troubles in
1863 had started with the Cheyennes and Arapahos. The government bribed these tribes
with presents. Carleton believed that the Kiowas and Comanches became jealous over
the gifts given by the government to the Cheyennes and Arapahos. The Kiowas and
Comanches must have wondered why the government would reward their misbehavior,
Carleton thought. He was of the opinion that the Kiowas and Comanches commenced
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depredations in an effort to convince the government to pay them off as it had the
Cheyennes and Arapahos.27
Michael Steck served as superintendent of Indian affairs for New Mexico
Territory at the time. Steck went to medical school in Pennsylvania and then joined a
wagon train bound for the West. He became agent to the Apaches in the early 1850s and
was promoted to territorial superintendent in 1863. He often feuded with Carleton on
everything from the general’s enforcement of martial law in the territory to the wisdom of
his Bosque Redondo Reservation project. The separation of leadership between the War
and Interior Departments did nothing to help the matter. Carleton fought to get the
federal Indian bureau to take over funding of the Bosque Redondo Reservation once he
had populated it with Navajos and Mescaleros. Steck refused to fund it, arguing to his
superiors in Washington that Bosque Redondo’s extravagant costs precluded the
reservation from being funded by any cabinet department but the War Department.28
Steck’s analysis of the rise in Kiowa and Comanche raiding came close to
agreeing with Carleton’s. Steck concurred with Carleton that the Indians were agitating
for provisions. But Steck believed the depredations were only being committed by a few
specific bands in the tribes. He argued that the U.S. government was responsible for the
robberies and murders on the overland trails. If the government would just hand out
more provisions and goods to Indians, there would be little if any trouble from them.
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Given the government’s stinginess with provisions and presents, Steck was surprised the
raiding had not been more intense, lethal, and destructive.29
Some observers offered naïve suggestions. Retrospectively, George Pettis
thought the Indians were somehow convinced that “the white man could be exterminated
by concerted action, and by striking at different points to have fondly hoped they could
once more roam and hunt at their pleasure, free and unmolested by white man’s
civilization.”30
Colonel W. S. Nye offers a more accurate explanation for the increased Indian
raids in 1864. In his history of Fort Sill, Nye addresses the “prairie war of 1863-64” in a
short chapter that deals with both the Comanche and Kiowa activity and the Cheyenne
and Arapaho uprising. He suggests Indian affinity for raiding exacerbated by absence of
regular troops during the Civil War caused the increase.31
Nye was correct about Comanches’ and Kiowas’ desire to raid. He was also right
that there were not enough troops to protect traffic on the Santa Fe Trail. However, this
circumstance was not unique to 1864 or the Civil War era. After an initial exodus of
regular troops at the outset of the Civil War, the federal government eventually manned
the frontier with ever larger contingents of troops – volunteers – than had been available
during the preceding decades.32
From the close of the Mexican-American War on, the U.S. government struggled
between two major frontier security strategies. It could scatter small posts throughout the
West wherever settlers needed protection, or it could mass large forces for an occasional
29
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summer punitive march. Neither option fielded an agile, mobile force. The decision
rested on whether authorities placed greater value on presence than on concentration of
power. Both were tried; neither worked. The post – Mexican-American War army had
an on-paper strength of scarcely more than ten thousand, and it increased only slightly
before 1861. Prior to the Mexican-American War and the settlement of the Oregon
question in the 1840s, the army had only to defend a “permanent Indian frontier,” aling
the western borders of Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Wisconsin. After the
war, there were too many square miles to defend and too little manpower.33
Emigration exacerbated the problem. Streams of pioneers raced across the Great
Plains to destinations west in the 1840s and 1850s. Surprisingly, the Civil War did not
stem that flow in the least. Even greater traffic through their traditional lands put
additional pressure on the Southern Plains tribes and often drew them to the immigrant
trails – whether to raid or trade. This increased pressure and contact made conflict more
likely than ever.34
Raiding was a cultural imperative for most Plains Indian males. Supply and
emigrant trains made their way across the heart of South Plains Indian territory on the
Santa Fe Trail with little or no escort. The army attempted to man a few posts along the
trail but lacked sufficient manpower to patrol its entire length. There were too many
trains to escort them all adequately. Trains often set out across this treacherous stretch of
unguarded and arid plains with inadequate protection. Although none of these factors
were unique to 1864, they do illustrate some reasons for the vulnerability of Santa Fe
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Trail traffic during the period leading to Carleton’s decision to strike. To the Plains
tribes, the trains must have seemed like ripe, low hanging fruit.
Assigning Responsibility and the Carleton – Steck Feud
Whatever the cause of the raids, they convinced army leadership that military
action was necessary. In order to respond, General Carleton had to determine who the
culprits were. Captain Nicholas Davis made a six-week scout from Fort Union between
August 4 and September 15. His circuitous path took him first to the breaks of the Red
River and then to Lone Mountain. The Davis party next visited the site of the Lower
Cimarron Springs attack. Davis found the corpses of the deceased strewn about the
prairie. After burying the bodies, the men visited the west end of the Dry Route.35 They
then visited the site of the Walnut Creek assault, saw where a train had been attacked at
Cow Creek. Enroute back to Santa Fe, they camped along the Arkansas River.36
At each stop on this scout, Davis collected evidence on most of the Indian attacks
listed above. In his report to General Carlton, he stated that eye witnesses had placed
responsibility for each and every occurrence on the Comanches and Kiowas.37 Some
other reports blamed the Walnut Creek raid on Arapahos, but the Comanches and Kiowas
were clearly responsible for the majority of the incidents. Based on the testimony at
hand, Carleton declared the Kiowas and Comanches hostile to the United States and
ordered frontier posts to guard against surprise attack.38
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Soon afterward, Carleton ordered a punitive winter campaign against the Kiowas
and Comanches. He selected Colonel Christopher “Kit” Carson, his primary field
commander, to lead the expedition.39 Carleton did not consult with Superintendent Steck
before ordering the strike. Steck only learned of the operation by reading a copy of
General Order Number 32, Carleton’s order to send Carson against the Plains tribes.40
Carleton had an aggressive, abrasive personality. He clearly rankled Steck by
unilaterally deciding to attack the Kiowas and Comanches. Furthermore, Steck doubted
the prudence of taking any military action against the Indians. First, he pointed out the
long record of peaceful relations between New Mexicans and Comanches. Second, he
argued that it was dangerous to pick a fight with a tribe as powerful as the Comanches.
Third, he made an effort to distinguish between the Comanches and Kiowas. Steck
claimed that his contacts in San Miguel County attributed any disturbances in the area to
Kiowas, who had been avenging the death of a chief. Steck believed that with vengeance
satisfied, the Kiowas now desired peace. Fourth, Steck conceded that Comanches had
been involved in raids into Confederate Texas, but that raiding aided the Union cause.
Comanches brought large herds of stock to New Mexico from the hated Texans.41 Steck
opposed a campaign against the Kiowas and Comanches outright. But if he could not
convince Carleton to cancel the operation altogether, he would do all he could to protect
the Comanches and divert Carleton’s wrath toward the Kiowas.
Carleton never liked Steck, whose determination to shield the Comanches aroused
Carlton’s suspicions. All of Carleton’s reports implicated the Comanches in the havoc of
the summer of 1864. Comanches almost certainly perpetrated the most damaging of the
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attacks, such as the incident at Lower Cimarron Springs. Why would Steck try to deny
their involvement? Carleton thought he had a pretty good idea.
Steck’s sources in San Miguel County profited from the Comanchero trade.
Comanche raids provided them an inexpensive source of goods and especially livestock.
They did not care whether the booty came from the Texas settlements or the Santa Fe
Trail. If relations with the Comanches deteriorated, that stream of bargains would
quickly run dry. Historians do not know whether Steck himself profited from the
Comanchero trade, but Carlton certainly suspected Steck of operating with an ulterior
motive.42
Carleton’s reservations went beyond a mere recognition of commercial interests.
He suspected full-scale Nuevo Mexicano (Hispanic New Mexican) support of the
mounting Indian war. Americans had not been running New Mexico for two full decades
in 1864. Many Nuevo Mexicanos held onto a latent animosity toward Americans.
Carleton had reason to believe that resentment might bloom into outright rebellion. In
1863, when North reported the possibility of a great Indian alliance, he also testified that
Comancheros were encouraging the Indians. Comancheros told the Indians that
Mexicans would stream out of New Mexico to join the alliance of Comanches, Plains
Apaches, Kiowas, Arapahos, Cheyennes, and Sioux against the Americans.43
The attack on the Allison train at Lower Cimarron Springs also helped convince
Carleton that Nuevo Mexicano information about the disposition of the Comanches could
not be taken at face value. Comanches and Kiowas killed only the whites in the train.
Carleton saw the fact that Kiowas and Comanches spared the Mexican teamsters and
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provided them means of transportation back to New Mexico as clear evidence that Nuevo
Mexicanos and Comanches were in collusion and neither could be trusted.44
Carleton may have had his own ulterior motives for driving the Comanches out of
the region. The previous winter, he had sent Carson on a successful campaign to round
up the Navajos. One of Carleton’s principal projects while department commander in
New Mexico was the establishment of a Navajo reservation called Bosque Redondo near
Fort Sumner. This establishment, designed to assimilate Navajos and Mescaleros into an
agricultural society, sat on the fringes of Comanchería. The Navajos and Mescalero
Apaches – traditional enemies of the Comanches – confined at Bosque Redondo made a
ripe target for Comanche raids.45
Carleton had a great deal of time, effort, resources, and his own reputation at
stake in Bosque Redondo. He desperately wanted to see the project to a successful
conclusion. However, it seems unlikely that Comanches could have made enough trouble
at Bosque Redondo to have motivated a punitive strike from Carleton solely on that basis.
The Navajos had only been there a few months when Carleton ordered the strike against
the Comanches and Kiowas. Anyhow, they were too busy pillaging the Texas
settlements and the Santa Fe Trail to have bothered with the struggling Navajos and
Mescaleros at Bosque Redondo.
In response to Steck’s arguments, Carleton offered to differentiate between “good
and bad” Comanches. He suggested that Steck send a representative along with Kit
Carson on the campaign. This agent could then sort the guilty from the innocent bands
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of Comanches if such discrimination could be made.46 The impracticality of this
suggestion suggests that Carleton may have been mocking Steck or pushing him to back
down or to consent to the campaign. In spite of his personal dislike for Steck, Carleton
did consider it important for both “branches of government” to share the same
objectives.47 On occasions when they could not agree, however, Carleton did not hesitate
to invoke a moral trump card, his “duty to protect the citizens of New Mexico,” to justify
his course of action over Steck’s.48
General Carleton was in no mood to follow Superintendent Steck’s military
advice, particularly since he believed Steck’s sources – and perhaps Steck himself – were
deeply interested in protecting their age-old trade relationship with the Comanches.
Throughout the first half of November, 1864 – even after Carson’s party had
embarked on the campaign – Steck still prosecuted his spirited effort to protect the
Comanches. He and Carleton exchanged a series of letters during this time. Although
they displayed the overtly congenial respect and deference typical of Victorian-era
correspondence, their mutual dislike became more thinly veiled as the interchange
continued.
Steck completely abandoned any attempt to relieve the Kiowas of responsibility.
In fact, by his second letter to Carleton he wrote, “The Kiowas I believe should be
severely chastised and hope the Genl. will be able to inflict the punishment they so richly
deserve.” He still favored excluding the Comanches. By this time, he admitted that some
Comanches may have been involved but argued that the involvement of a few did not
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justify punishing the whole tribe. Further, Steck claimed that any Comanche
participation must have been instigated by renegade whites or secessionists, although he
offered no evidence to support this hypothesis. Steck was angry at being left out of
Carleton’s investigations into culpability for the summer raids. Carleton’s use of Utes
and Jicarilla Apaches in Carson’s punitive party without consulting Steck also offended
him.49
After Steck’s exchange with General Carleton became a hopeless and
acrimonious exercise, the Superintendent washed his hands of the matter.50 He sent
copies of the entire string of correspondence to U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs
William Dole with a recommendation that the matter be brought before Secretary of War
Edwin M. Stanton.51
The Decision to Act
In 1864, Secretary Stanton had larger problems and issues to resolve than a
dispute over which Indians to punish for frontier raids. By the time Steck involved Dole
and attempted to alert the secretary of war, the issue was moot. Colonel Carson and his
battalion had embarked on their campaign. By November 10, the expedition was at Fort
Bascom.52
New Mexico could not support even a small army domestically in the 1860s. The
Department of New Mexico relied on supplies imported from the states. These goods
could only reach New Mexico by one route, the Santa Fe Trail. That road was the very
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lifeline of the department. All communications and supplies bound for New Mexico
came over the trail.
When the Confederates invaded in 1862, they were tactically successful on the
battlefield. Only the loss of their supply train at Glorieta Pass turned them back. Even at
a strength of only 2,590, Sibley’s Texans had not been able to live off the land.53 They
practically starved on the long walk back to San Antonio. Perhaps Carleton’s knowledge
of that incident helped make up his mind to protect his lines of supply and
communication at nearly all costs.
So ultimately, Carleton’s decision was easy. He used the term “avenge” in some
of his correspondence with Steck. But revenge was not a necessity. Carleton felt that in
order to keep his army – not to mention some eight thousand Mescalero and Navajo
charges at Bosque Redondo54 – well fed and supplied, he would have to punish the tribes
and prevent future threats to Santa Fe Trail traffic. “It is certainly understood that the
interruption to our line of travel to the States is owing to the hostility of the Cheyennes,
Arapahoes, Comanches and Kiowas,” Carleton told Steck.55 He could not permit that
line to be endangered. Colorado and Kansas could take care of the Cheyennes and
Arapahos, but if the Comanches and Kiowas were to be dealt with, Carleton would have
to do it himself.
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2. U.S. Military Participants in the Adobe Walls Campaign and Their Auxiliaries
The Problem of Finding Troops
Once General Carleton decided to strike the Kiowas and Comanches threatening
his line of communication with the East, the real planning had to begin. Military
manpower in New Mexico was scarce. The Army had never manned its frontier regions
adequately following the war with Mexico.1 The Civil War placed an even greater
premium on federal troops. Given the U.S. military situation at the time, Carleton
probably knew that he would have to construct an unconventional military force for this
punitive campaign. He may have anticipated this obstacle, but he did attempt to solicit
regulars from outside the Department of New Mexico to strengthen his expeditionary
party.
Carleton first sought additional manpower from the East. He may have felt that
with hundreds of thousands of troops fighting for the Union in the Eastern theaters, the
War Department could spare a few hundred to keep New Mexico secure. Carleton wrote
Major General Henry “Old Brains” Halleck for troops. By this time, Halleck had been
relieved as commander in chief of Union Armies and was serving as chief of staff under
Ulysses S. Grant. Halleck thought it preposterous that Carleton should ask for troops
from the main theaters of war. Halleck considered the Indian trouble on the South Plains
resolved as a result of U.S. military successes against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in
Kansas. That assumption illustrated Halleck’s lack of understanding of the military
situation along the Santa Fe Trail. Even had he understood the difference between the
Cheyenne-Arapaho affair and the Kiowa-Comanche activity, it is unlikely that he would
have authorized troop reinforcements for Carleton. As it was, Halleck indicated that he
1
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might even be inclined to remove troops from the Southwest. After that rejection,
Carleton looked elsewhere for the additional manpower. The potential benefit of
explaining the situation to Halleck would have been offset by the risk that Carleton might
actually lose troops in his attempts to garner reinforcements.2
Carleton next looked to the Kansas and Missouri theater for support. He planned
to stage a multipronged attack on the Kiowas and Comanches camped for the winter
somewhere between his command and the posts in south-central Kansas. Carleton wrote
Department of Kansas commander Major General Samuel R. Curtis in October of 1864 to
outline his plan. Carleton proposed a cooperative action between his own troops moving
up the Canadian and a large force under Major General James G. Blunt that would “make
this the last war that it will be necessary to prosecute against these two most treacherous
tribes of the plains.”3
Curtis agreed to Carleton’s plan in principle and agreed to the plan. Carleton
promptly relayed that assent to Blunt in an effort to expedite his scheme.4 However,
when it came to prioritizing military operations, Curtis, like Halleck, was more concerned
with Confederates in Missouri and Arkansas than with Kiowas and Comanches.
In the fall of 1864, Confederate forces mounted their last serious challenge to
Union troops in the Trans-Mississippi region. Major General Sterling Price led a force of
about 8,500 Confederate troops to liberate his home state of Missouri. Price advanced as
far as Kansas City, where he was turned back by Curtis’s command at the Battle of
2
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Westport on October 23, 1864. In the weeks leading up to Carleton’s strike against the
Kiowas and Comanches, Curtis was pondering how to deal with this threat from Price’s
advancing force. During the last week of September, Curtis directed Blunt to protect the
Santa Fe Trail as best he could by stringing a few troops along his section of it. Blunt
and the remainder of his troops were to rendezvous with Curtis’s main force at Council
Grove.5 This would allow Blunt and his troops to help Curtis check the Confederate
advance in Missouri but prevent Blunt from participating in any meaningful action
against the Kiowas and Comanches on the Southern Plains.
Although it appears Carleton sent Kit Carson into the field to strike the
Comanches and Kiowas under the assumption that Carson’s force would be cooperating
with a significant body of troops from Blunt’s command, the support from Blunt never
materialized. Carson’s battalion would fight at the Adobe Walls with only the military
force that could be raised in New Mexico.
Carleton also proved diligent in his search for manpower in New Mexico. In his
refusal to send Carleton troops from the East, Halleck did authorize him to call upon the
territorial governor if he needed additional troops to replace those whose terms of service
were expiring. Carleton could also call up additional territorial militia, but only if the
summons was deemed “absolutely necessary.”6 Like many military commanders of his
day, Carleton considered every project he undertook “absolutely necessary.” Not
surprisingly, Carleton immediately requested that Governor Connelly call out a portion of
the New Mexico militia to participate in the campaign. Governor Connelly proved to be
just another obstacle to Carleton’s plans. Connelly agreed with Steck on the Comanche
5
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question. Like Steck, he claimed that the Comanches were at peace with New Mexico.7
He, too, may have been influenced by players in the local economy of the Rio Grande
Valley, which was heavily reliant on Comanchero trade. Whatever the reason, Connelly
refused Carleton’s request to activate more territorial militia to support the campaign.
This absence of support from outside New Mexico left Carleton to prosecute the
campaign with troops at his disposal. This meant the primary force would be composed
of New Mexico, Colorado, and California volunteers. Some of these units were the
remnants of those used to repel Sibley’s Confederate invasion in 1862. Others were part
of the “California Column” which had marched to New Mexico under Carleton to aid
Canby in repelling Sibley’s invasion, but had not arrived in time to participate in the
campaign. The Californians remained in New Mexico to protect it from future
Confederate advances and to quell Indian disturbances if needed.8
Carleton’s meddling with Indian affairs in New Mexico did present him with
another option. He could use Indian tribes on friendly terms with the federal government
against others he considered hostile. General Carleton relied heavily on his field
commander, Kit Carson, to rally support from friendly tribes. As a former fur trapper and
Indian agent, Carson had developed a good relationship with the Utes.9
In absence of an overwhelming force of federal troops, Carleton toyed with the
idea of sending a force comprised solely of Utes and Jicarilla Apaches. Carson, however,
argued that an all-Indian force would be impossible to control and that U.S. troops, even
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if they were volunteers, should make up the majority of the strike force.10 Carleton
wisely took Carson’s advice and ultimately used friendly Indians as an auxiliary force
supplementing the California and New Mexico volunteers launched against the
Comanches and Kiowas.
In spite of any difficulties anticipated in controlling Indian auxiliaries, they were a
tempting source of manpower for several reasons. First and perhaps most importantly,
they were readily available and not preoccupied with fighting Rebels. New Mexico
military authorities believed some tribes would be willing allies. The Utes and Jicarilla
Apaches were “mountain Indians.” They bore a traditional animosity toward Plains
tribes such as the Comanches and Kiowas. Carleton believed that this feud, combined
with Carson’s established relationship with the Utes, would make it easier for federal
forces in New Mexico to recruit from the ranks of some tribes.11
Carleton expressed another belief commonly held by federal authorities in frontier
regions. He thought there would be a political advantage in creating and maintaining
alliances with some tribes against others considered belligerent by federal authorities. By
allying with friendlier tribes, Carleton hoped to prevent the outbreak of a general Indian
war pitting all Indians against the Angloamericans in New Mexico.12 This line of
thinking implied a divide and conquer strategy. Carleton did not necessarily think that
the Utes and Jicarillas would be an indispensable addition to his force. He was hell-bent
on sending Carson out to punish the Comanches and Kiowas with or without them. But
he believed that in addition to the extra manpower they brought, the employment of
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Indian auxilliaries would help keep Indians as a whole divided and therefore weak and
incapable of massive, unified, organized resistance.
Carleton queried one other Indian source for assistance. Prior to the Navajos’
arrival at Bosque Redondo, Carson had subdued the Mescalero Apaches, who had
become Bosque Redondo’s first occupants. When the Mescaleros at Bosque Redondo
asked Carleton for horses and food, he told them he had no horses to give away. He did
indicate, however, that horses would be available to those who joined Carson’s punitive
expedition onto the plains. Carleton added that there were plenty of rations at Fort
Bascom, the jumping off point for the Adobe Walls Campaign.13 In spite of these
enticements, though, Carleton was unsuccessful in recruiting any manpower from the
relocated Mescaleros.
Composition of the Federal Force
Field Commander. In addition to finding manpower, General Carleton had to
appoint someone to command the expedition. As department commander, Carleton
directed military operations in New Mexico from his headquarters in Santa Fe. Like
most departmental commanders, Carleton needed a field commander to direct military
actions in person. Finding manpower may have been difficult for Carleton, but choosing
a field commander was easy: Carson was the obvious choice.
Kit Carson had dealt with Indians in every phase of his life.14 He grew up in a
Missouri-frontier settlement constantly threatened with Indian attack. As a mountain
man in the West, Carson learned to trade and interact with some Indians, and how to fight
others effectively. He fought and negotiated with Indians while guiding John C.
13
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Frémont’s explorations of the West in the early to mid 1840s. As an Indian agent in New
Mexico, he labored diligently to improve federal treatment of certain tribes of Indians.
Biographer Edward Sabin called Carson’s attitude toward Indians during his agency as
“hopeless compassion.”15
Carleton certainly would have wanted to leverage Carson’s experience as an agent
to the Utes to garner support from the “mountain Indians.” But he did not select Carson
to lead the expedition for primarily diplomatic reasons. Carson was a well-known and
highly successful Indian fighter – a true legend in his own time. His campaign against
the Navajos had devastated them. Carson was in his mid-fifties by 1864. He brought
exceptional experience to the task of punishing the Comanches and Kiowas.
Carleton himself was no stranger to Indian Wars. It was, in fact, Kit Carson who
introduced Carleton to Indian fighting. They served together against the Mescaleros in
1854. In that conflict, Carleton learned the basic difficulties Indian fighting presented
and gained an appreciation for the differences between Indian campaigns and
conventional warfare. Much of this he learned from Kit Carson, the master craftsman of
the trade.16
General Carleton had placed Carson in command of previous expeditions against
the Mescalero Apaches and the Navajos. Once entrusted with these missions, Carson
carried them out effectively. Both tribes were subdued and sent to Bosque Redondo. Kit
Carson executed these campaigns over the course of one winter apiece. Particularly
against the Navajo during the winter of 1863-1864, Carson’s winter campaigning
techniques brought a rapid end to the conflict. His men went about destroying Navajo
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foodstuffs and cornfields. The resulting lack of food forced the Navajos to capitulate and
begin their “Long Walk” east to Fort Sumner.
This effectiveness displayed by Carson against the Mescaleros and the Navajos
compelled Carleton to order Carson to command the Comanche-Kiowa expedition.
There is no evidence that Carleton ever considered anyone else. Carson’s successes on
previous missions against Indians made him the best fit to wage the campaign.
Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Francisco P. Abreu commanded the infantry
contingent assigned to the expedition. Abreu had recently commanded Fort Union and
would serve another stint as commander of that post in early 1865, not long after his
return from Adobe Walls. He held a commission in the First Infantry of the New Mexico
Volunteers. He was a resident of San Miguel County, and lived out his life there after
completing his military service.17
Abreu’s infantry contingent was small. Portions of two California Volunteer
Infantry companies were attached to the force. In all, Abreu had under his command less
than ninety infantrymen, many of who were assigned to Lieutenant Pettis’s small artillery
unit. Some of the participating cavalry, however, fought dismounted and were treated as
infantry, at least in the execution of portions of the battle itself.18
Cavalry. Cavalry comprised the majority of the U.S. military contingent on the
Adobe Walls campaign. Carson had at his disposal four full cavalry companies and a
detachment from a fifth, for a total of over 240 officers and men. As mentioned
previously, not all of these men were mounted. Two companies came from the First
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Cavalry of New Mexico Volunteers, while the other two and another fraction had been
part of the First Cavalry of California Volunteers.19
Major William McCleave was selected to command the cavalry arm. Like most
of the accompanying cavalry, McCleave was a member of the First Cavalry of California
Volunteers. He was a veteran of the trip from California, and as such had been under
Carleton’s command for some time. He seems to have been well qualified for the job,
and the best equipped in terms of manpower of the component commanders.20
Carleton placed special trust in McCleave. The general was often able to
overlook faults in subordinates whom he thought were generally upstanding and
competent. McCleave, an Irish immigrant, enlisted in the regular dragoons in 1850.
Early in his career, he was arrested after a drunken tirade in which he threatened an
officer. He was made to walk bound behind a wagon from Las Vegas to Santa Fe.
Carleton thought enough of him to appoint him first sergeant. He left the regular army in
1860, but joined the volunteer First California Cavalry as a captain once the war broke
out. He played a pivotal role in Carleton’s and Carson’s roundup of the Mescalero
Apaches in 1862, for which he later received a brevet promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.
McCleave continued his service in the regular army’s officer corps until his retirement in
1879.21
Artillery. Lieutenant George H. Pettis took charge of the artillery. U.S. troops on
Indian campaigns often did not take along artillery. Fortunately, Carson’s command did.
Pettis commanded of an element of one company of infantry totaling twenty-seven
19
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men.22 He had two mountain howitzers at his disposal. It would seem that twenty-seven
men would be a few too many to operate two small guns. It is not clear whether he was
merely placed in charge of this cadre of infantry and happened to have the mountain
howitzers, or whether his men had been trained specifically to operate the guns.
The mountain howitzer was a small artillery piece. Howitzers in general were
designed to be more mobile than other pieces of field artillery. For that purpose, they
were shorter in all aspects. Even the tongue/trail was shorter. This difference in length
from other field guns made howitzers less stable. As a result, howitzers had to be fired
with smaller charges and thus had a shorter range and had to be fired at a higher
trajectory. Military leaders often accepted these limitations in favor of the mountain
howitzer’s greater mobility.23
Mountain howitzers in particular were a type of pack howitzer. Mountain
howitzers were designed to be highly mobile and transportable over difficult terrain.
Military crew members could disassemble them into just a few relatively small parts,
each of which could be borne by a single pack animal. Carson originally intended to
bring a train of pack animals on the trip. When only one hundred pack saddles could be
found, he opted instead to bring a wagon train.24 Even with a wagon train rather than
pack animals, mountain howitzers would have been the only field artillery that could
have been brought on the trip. These small field guns would prove an essential
psychological and tactical weapon at the Battle of Adobe Walls.
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Auxiliaries. More than once General Carleton toyed with the idea of
supplementing his uniformed manpower with Indian auxiliaries. As early as 1862, he
discussed with Carson the possibility of seeking Ute cooperation against Confederate
invaders. Although that plan never came to fruition, he believed that finding Indian
auxiliaries to join Carson in his strike on the Comanches and Kiowas ought to be easier
than convincing them to fight Rebels.25 Mountain tribes had been hereditary enemies of
Plains tribes like the Comanches and Kiowas. Carleton believed that Carson could easily
use his influence with the mountain Indians of Northern New Mexico to garner a good
deal of manpower from these tribes.
Attaining that support proved not to be so easy. Carson went to Cimarron, New
Mexico, to recruit Utes and Jicarrilas for the expedition. He departed Cimarron with a
sizeable Indian auxiliary force from those tribes, but he had great difficulty convincing
them to participate. Carson ended up enticing some Utes and Jicarillas to join the
expedition by promising them extra rations, a pound and a half of extra meat and flour.
Even at that, Carson did not get the hearty response Carleton had expected, at least in part
because the rations were not present. They were just a promise, albeit a promise from a
relatively trusted source, Carson. Carson wrote General Carleton to request the extra
provisions be sent to Lucien B. Maxwell, and to warn him that keeping the agreement
would be important in preserving Ute and Jicarilla cooperation. It would not only keep
those tribes friendly to whites, but also keep them on terms for use in future campaigns
should they become necessary.26
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Carson initially left Cimarron with sixty-five Utes and Jicarilla Apaches. He later
amended the number to eighty-two in a postscript to the letter he sent to Carleton
requesting provisions. In his after-action report, Carson reported that seventy-five
Indians made the entire trip. Once along, these Utes and Apaches proved to be
enthusiastic warriors, chomping at the bit for a chance to wreak havoc on their enemies
from the plains.27
A Force Evaluation
In spite of all General Carleton’s searching for additional troops for this punitive
expedition, he believed this force of 321 officers and men with 75 Indian auxiliaries
would be sufficient to accomplish his tactical goals. At least that is what he told Kit
Carson. Carleton said he gave Carson “more than he requested” because he intended
Carson to give these Indians, especially the Kiowas, “a severe drubbing.”28
But would a force of about four hundred men be adequate to subdue two powerful
tribes likely concentrated in their winter encampments? In The Comanchero Frontier,
Charles Kenner argues emphatically that Carson’s force was far too small for the task at
hand.29 Kenner’s retrospective assessment happens to be true, but that may be a bit of
Monday morning quarterbacking. Should Carleton have known his force was too small?
It certainly had been difficult, to that point, to find Plains Indians concentrated in
large aggregates. Carleton may have thought a force of four hundred would be more than
adequate to punish whatever individual bands Carson would encounter on the South
Plains. Carleton anticipated a cooperating force under Blunt to march toward the
Canadian from Fort Larned to the east. Carleton’s expectation of a two-pronged attack
27
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may have left him with the impression that the mission could be accomplished with a
small force raised from the New Mexico theater.
Even if Carleton somehow knew he would get no help from Blunt and the Kansas
units, past experience may have led him to believe that only a limited force was necessary
to operate against and chastise the Indians. Carson had perfected winter campaigning
techniques against the Navajos during the winter of 1863-1864. By concentrating on
destroying food stuffs and the Navajo means of survival, Carson had forced them to
surrender without fighting a pitched battle. These tactics allowed him to subdue the
Navajos – a tribe arguably as powerful as the Comanches – with a force of only 389
men.30 Why should a winter campaign against the Comanches and Kiowas require any
more personnel or firepower?
The Plains Indians often scattered at the first sign of an enemy attack – a tactic
that they applied for several reasons. Obviously, a surprise cavalry attack would first and
foremost put families and noncombatants in jeopardy. Additionally, Plains tribes seldom
lingered to give battle unless victory was almost certain. They would only fight with a
distinct and massive advantage, unless cornered. Knowing these tendencies, Carleton
may have been content to deploy a small force. Even if they would not be able to roundup and capture all Comanches and Kiowas (this was never the objective in the first
place), Carson’s battalion would be in little jeopardy. Once engaged, the Indians would
likely not enjoy a decisive advantage and would thus be inclined to break off any
engagements that might put Carson’s party at risk for severe casualties.
In retrospect, Carleton erred in sending such a small strike force against the two
powerful South Plains tribes. But for the several reasons listed above, he expressed
30
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contentment with the force he fielded. He had a sound, experienced field commander in
Carson. He had done his due diligence to secure more troops – they were simply not
available. The force seemed large enough, and the winter-campaign tactics had proven
successful in the past. General Carleton was confident of a favorable outcome.31
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3. Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches
The Southern Plains are a hard place. They boast a unique beauty, but the very
elements that make the Plains beautiful make them a difficult place to live. Massive
summer storms seem to rise from nowhere. Endless prairies wave in the wind that blows
incessantly. Extreme weather fronts sweep across the smooth terrain. The same day can
be hot and cold. Sometimes the day’s high temperature is set at 12:01 a.m., and it just
gets colder all day. West of the hundredth meridian, mother nature often fails to produce
enough water to grow much more than a good crop of grass. Then water comes, but
when it does, it can fall in a massive downpour or a destructive hail storm.
Life on the plains demands adaptability, and a certain toughness. This is true
today, and was even more so before the age of modern technology and conveniences.
Tools, however, often help humans to adapt to harsh environments. They allow
humankind to overcome difficult circumstances. A few Indians lived on the Southern
Plains prior to contact with Europeans. But the tribes that occupied the Southern Plains
by the mid nineteenth century had utilized tools acquired from Europeans to populate the
arid plains in greater numbers and more effectively exploit them than had their
predecessors.
It was not so much contact with Europeans that so profoundly changed the plains
lifestyle as the material and animal culture introduced by outsiders. Europeans brought
with them tools that utterly transformed life on the plains. With them came, among other
things, the horse and the firearm. Elliott West says that horses and guns were essentially
the cotton gins and steamboats of the Indians and the Great Plains.1

1

West, Contested Plains, 55; Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (1931; reprint, Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1981), 52-67.

45

Before horses, Plains tribes used dogs for work and aid in transportation. The
horse allowed Plains Indians to shift from a society that occasionally hunted buffalo to a
truly nomadic, hunt-centered existence. Plains Indians hunted buffalo before acquiring
the horse. The horse culture allowed an amazing hunting efficiency not otherwise
possible.2
Firearms were less important than horses in this shift toward reliance on the
buffalo. Indians hunting on horseback preferred the more mobile traditional bow and
arrow for the task at hand. Firearms did, however, prove useful in another aspect of this
cultural change. Many different tribes had the same designs on the newly viable buffalo
hunting lifestyle. They converged on the now highly desirable hunting grounds of the
High Plains. The situation spelled conflict. The firearm, combined with the horse, made
Plains warriors decisively more mobile and deadly than they had been. Plains tribes’
masterful application of the horse and firearm arguably made them the world’s finest
light cavalry.3
Horses and guns gave Plains Indians a new identity. These tools ushered in a
completely new way of life. They gave the Indians power, mobility, freedom, and
responsibility. But horses also required additional resources and care. They sparked
changes in geography among tribes as well as lifestyle. They allowed greater access to
resources, and caused conflict.4 Acquisition of the horse simultaneously brought great
power and caused unforeseen strife.
Tribes like the Kiowas and Comanches had not always been on the Great Plains,
nor had they always been horse cultures. But by the mid nineteenth century, they were
2

West, Contested Plains, 70-71.
Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 7.
4
West, Contested Plains, 55-58.
3

46

clearly defined by both the animal upon which they depended, and the environment in
which they lived.
Kiowas
The Kiowas were one of these groups that converged on the Plains as they
adapted to the horse culture. According to tradition and oral history, they emerged from
the area around the headwaters of the Yellowstone River. Some traditional stories allude
to the geysers famous to that region. Kiowas spoke a dialect most closely related to the
Tanoan languages of the Pueblo tribes. This linguistic difference separates them from the
the Comanches and Kiowa-Apaches (or Plains Apaches), the tribes with whom they
became most closely associated.5
While living in the mountains, the Kiowas hunted buffalo but used dogs and
travois for transportation. They surrounded bands of bison on foot and drove them over
cliffs. After some ancient disagreement, the Kiowas divided into two groups and left the
Yellowstone area. One group traveled northward and became disaffiliated with the tribe.
The party we now call Kiowas moved out onto the plains. Their oral history from this
period seems to refer to geographical features such as Devil’s Tower and the Black
Hills.6
Upon arriving on the Northern Plains, Kiowas soon ran into the Crows and
Arikaras. The Kiowas made an alliance with the Crows sometime in the very early
eighteenth century. From this interaction with other plains peoples, Kiowas developed
into the horse-based raiding culture they became known for. During this period, they
5
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adopted buffalo-hide lodges, the Sun Dance, and the use of horses. Kiowas may not have
even known about the existence of the horse before their rendezvous with the Crows.
Ethnologist James Mooney visited the Kiowas in 1896 as part of an effort to collect what
knowledge he could about the tribe before it disappeared. (The perception of the Indian
as a “vanishing American” was prevalent in Mooney’s time). Several of the eldest
members of the tribe claimed at that time to remember this affiliation with the Crows and
Arikaras. Although Crow tradition does not corroborate the Kiowa version of a close
relationship, they were likely in some contact, and Kiowas probably acquired the skills
and culture associated with the plains life from observing or associating with either the
Crows or some similar tribe.7
At first, horses did not come easily to the Kiowas. They were able to acquire
them a few at a time in raids on their future allies, the Comanches, whom they pressured
toward the south with their occupation of the area near the Crows. This dearth of horses
did not last long. In 1682, LaSalle said the Plains tribes he encountered had “plenty of
horses, probably stolen from Mexico.” He was most likely referring to the Kiowas,
Kiowa-Apaches, and other tribes of that area. While this acquisition of horses certainly
helped make the Kiowas more efficient hunters, it also gained them prowess and renown
as raiders. By the 1730s, they had already been condemned by the Spaniards, who
labeled Kiowas among the hostile tribes.8
Lakota and Cheyenne pressure pushed the Kiowas south toward the end of the
eighteenth century. The Kiowas collided with northern bands of Comanches and pushed
them south. Comanches and Kiowas had an adversarial relationship as this migratory
7
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pressure mounted. Kiowas passed through the region of the upper Platte and Republican
Rivers, eventually coming to the region they controlled during recorded history.
Although their raids covered a vast area including Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and even the
coastal bend area of Texas, Kiowa territory was generally thought to have included parts
of western Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle, as well as bits of northeastern New
Mexico, southeastern Colorado, and southwestern Kansas.9
Kiowa-Apaches or Plains Apaches
Kiowa-Apaches were a small, Athapascan tribe occupying the Great Plains in the
mid nineteenth century. Several bands of Apaches gained horses very soon after the
Spanish arrival in the Rio Grande Valley in 1598. These bands, with the advantage of
their mounts, charged onto the plains, lances in hand, and drove Caddoan fixedagriculture societies off the high prairies eastward in the sixteenth or early seventeenth
century. After their arrival on the plains, they settled in the river valleys and planted
crops such as maize, beans, squash, and tobacco. They based their economy on both
sedentary agriculture and the buffalo hunt. Sometime after their arrival, these Plains
Apaches broke into several bands – what were later known as Jicarillas, Lipans, and
Kiowa-Apaches.10
It was the northernmost of these three bands that later came to be known as
Kiowa-Apaches. They appear to have occupied parts of western Kansas and dwelt along
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the Canadian River for a time during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Early European travelers found them to be reliant on the buffalo but short on horses.11
As the Comanches flooded onto the plains in the early eighteenth century, they
forced these bands of Plains Apaches to scatter. While other groups headed south or
west, the “proto” Kiowa-Apaches fled north and ran into the Kiowas. Thus began an
enduring relationship that so clearly stamped the Kiowa-Apaches that it became their
identifying feature. The Kiowas took in this Plains Apache tribe. By this time, they
numbered only a few hundred. Kiowa-Apaches remained autonomous in language,
internal politics, and social structure. They even retained some of their unique cultural
attributes. They did, however, borrow many aspects of Plains Indian culture from the
Kiowas. They maintained representation at Kiowa tribal councils.12
This alliance saved the Kiowa-Apaches from oblivion, and allowed them to return
to the part of the plains they identified as their homeland. They would later find
themselves in a much larger, more powerful alliance as a result.13
Comanches
Like the Kiowas, the Comanches emerged from the mountains. Crow tradition
has their origins in the Snake River region. These early people were not, however, the
Comanches known to history on their exodus to the plains. In their earlier history, the
Comanches were an indistinguishable part of the Shoshones whence they came. Lewis
and Clark knew only of the Shoshones. Like many other peoples that became the Plains
warriors of the nineteenth century, the component of the Shoshone that became the
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Comanches made their way onto the plains either due to a change in climate, pressure
from other tribes, or perhaps attraction to the bison-hunting life.14
By the mid seventeenth century, a distinct group of Plains Shoshone had emerged.
They were a dog-based culture, taking to the horseless version of the buffalo hunt.
Pedestrian stalkers carefully planned means of stampeding the animals over a cliff or into
an area of deep snow or melting ice where they could be more easily dispatched with the
tools at hand.15
Late in the seventeenth century, these Plains Shoshones split. One component
headed north. The others – one author calls them “proto-Comanches” – moved south,
apparently into the Ute country that is now northern New Mexico and southern Colorado.
They may have moved due to pressure from other tribes. Maybe Plains tribes from
farther east shared European diseases with these early Comanches, prompting the move.
By this time, they had also been exposed to the horse and may very well have moved
south to gain better access to the horse supply in Spanish New Mexico.16
Whatever their reason for moving, the Comanches established a relationship with
the Utes, with whom hey had linguistic ties. This may have been a basis for early
interaction. Although the Utes were not purely a Plains tribe, they had access to horses
and introduced the Comanches to many methods and customs that would come to define
their prominence on the plains. For a time, they even shared territory with the Utes, who
seem to have shared horsemanship skills with the Comanches. They also introduced the
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Comanches to the nuances of Spanish borderland interactions. Comanches also learned
the advantages of trade with the New Mexico settlements.17
They may have still occupied some Ute territory, but by the turn of the eighteenth
century, Comanches had moved into the headwaters of the Arkansas, where the Spanish
encountered them. Some bands still relied on dogs for transportation as late as 1726. But
by the 1710s, mounted Comanches raided New Mexico villages often enough for the
Spanish to call them “fierce but elusive raiders.”18
The Spanish and Jicarilla Apaches entered an alliance in 1719 in a futile attempt
to check Comanche military and political incursions on the Southern Plains. The
Comanches had already gained the upper hand on the Jicarillas, and they were too fast
and too far from Spanish centers of power for the alliance to be effective. A Spanish
punitive expedition set out in 1719 to crush the Comanches, but met with only frustration,
burnt fields of Apache maize, and Jicarillas running the other direction.19
At mid century, Comanches had not yet reached the height of their power, but
they had established the limits of what territory they would control. Comanches swept
the Jicarilla Apaches from the New Mexico and Texas plains, and drove the Lipans off
the southern reaches of Texas grassland. Their domain, known as “Comanchería,” now
stretched from the Arkansas River to the Balcones Escarpment in Texas, and from the
Pecos River to the Cross Timbers area in central Texas and Oklahoma. They had
massive herds of horses and were the most feared horsemen on the plains.20
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Comanchería suited its occupants well. It was close enough to Spanish New
Mexico to make raids convenient, yet far enough to make Spanish reprisals difficult.
Comanche retreat onto the Llano Estacado made life difficult, if not dangerous, for
foreign pursuers. A Spanish party on the caprock had to contend with a well-mounted,
adroit enemy, long supply lines in relatively barren territory, and a landscape almost
completely devoid of landmarks. One of the best defensive aspects of the Llano Estacado
was its ability to geographically baffle outsiders. These plains also suited Comanche
horses well. The horses they acquired from the Spanish originated in North African
Barb/Iberian crosses bred to survive desert conditions and live strictly off grass.21
For a time, other tribes formed a barrier between Comanches and most European
colonial powers. Lipans and Tonkawas stood between Comanches and the Texas
settlements. Cheyennes and Arapahoes sat between the Comanches and the English and
French. Comanchería bordered only New Spain, which by the mid eighteenth century
was not the power it had once been. Indeed, Comanchería offered the Comanches and
their future allies an ideal locale from which they could build a position of impressive
power.22
Beginning in 1752, the Spanish government in New Mexico took a different tack
on Comanche relations – at least part of the time. Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín saw
Comanches as a potential trade partner, as well as a barrier to French and Anglo
expansion in the continental interior. He adopted a policy of peace toward the
Comanches and allowed them into the New Mexico trade fairs. Although the peace
between Spanish New Mexico and the Comanches proved to be only temporary, it was
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the beginning of several important developments. It opened the door to meaningful trade
between the two peoples, ended serious Spanish challenges to Comanche control of the
area between the Arkansas and the Red Rivers, and essentially ended the now-obsolete
Ute-Comanche alliance.23
As often happened with agreements between Indians and Europeans or
Americans, changes in political leadership muddled Comanche relations with New
Mexico. When Cachupín rotated out of New Mexico, relations soured and the raids
recommenced. Cachupín returned to the governor’s office in 1762, and the trade
reopened and amicable interaction resumed. Comanche raiding patterns may also have
been driven by a careful evaluation of which course of action, raiding or trading, was
more profitable at the time. This cycle continued until a more lasting agreement with the
Spanish was reached in 1786. From that point forward, the Comanches primarily traded
with New Mexico and, with a few exceptions, turned their horses toward the Texas
frontier and Mexico proper for raiding opportunities.24
Comanches had become arguably the most dominant force in the region by the
end of the eighteenth century. They controlled a large territory. They ran a profitable
trade operation. They had mastered the Plains Indian horse culture. For all of their
benefits, these accomplishments also earned the Comanches enemies. The Utes gave the
Comanches more than just an introduction to the horse. They also named the
Comanches. The word Comanche is a Spanish derivative of the Ute word for “enemy,”
which literally translated means, “anyone who wants to fight me all the time.” This name
reflected Comanche power and their neighbors’ perception of them. Their list of
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traditional enemies by this time included Utes, Pawnees, Osages, Tonkawas, Navajos,
and Jicarilla Apaches. They occasionally scrapped with Cheyennes and Arapahoes who
had been driven south by the Sioux as well. The Comanches may have been strong
enough militarily to deal with any of these foes alone, but a combination might pose a
threat. The Comanches showed a diplomatic skill that complemented their renowned
trading and raiding prowess by forming a helpful and powerful alliance.25
Native Alliance
Sometime in the very late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, members of the
Kiowa and Comanche tribes met by accident in the community of San Miguel del Vado.
A Spanish settler friendly to both sides helped the tribes negotiate a peace that proved
exceptionally durable. From this period on, the Kiowas, Kiowa-Apaches, and
Comanches occupied common territory (although some Comanche bands ranged much
further south than the Kiowas or Kiowa-Apaches) and shared many customs.26
The Comaches were clearly the dominant force in this alliance. At the time, the
Kiowas numbered only about twelve hundred, and the Kiowa-Apaches as few as three
hundred. The smaller tribes offered political, military, and economic aid without greatly
taxing the resources of Comanchería.27
The business aspect of this relationship should not be overlooked. The
Comanches by this time ran a thriving trade with the New Mexico settlements. Kiowas
and Kiowa-Apaches formed a conduit with their northern allies. The Mandans and
Hidatsas had better access to English firearms due to their contact with the East. The
Kiowas often transported horses up to the Mandan and Hidatsa villages on the Missouri,
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where they traded for better quality firearms than were available in the Rio Grande
Valley. Kiowas likely often had a role in acquiring the horses and probably distributed
the European firearms among their Comanche allies.28
Although it has been suggested that commerce was the most important factor in
the Comanche – Kiowa – Kiowa-Apache alliance, this aspect of the relationship cannot
be differentiated from the alliance’s military benefits. Raiding was a fundamental part of
the Comanche alliance’s commerce. Comanches stole massive numbers of horses from
Spanish colonies and later Texas settlements. Without these raids, they would not have
had anything to sell. They literally put into effect the Bedouin proverb, “Raiding is our
agriculture.” Raiding by this alliance drove their commercial ventures.29
For all these tribes of the Plains culture, raiding was the genesis of nearly
everything important in a male’s life. These tribes cultivated and maintained a martial
society. Status followed from raiding and warfare exploits. Honor came from raiding, as
did material possessions, which could then be traded for other, rarer goods found only on
the periphery of Comanchería. Status, honor, and material possessions all derived from
raiding and military success. So this three-way alliance was beneficial to the three tribes
militarily and commercially, but those elements were one and the same.30
This culture of raiding depended almost completely on the horse. Horses not only
were much larger and stronger than dogs, their previous source of transportation and
animal labor, but they more efficiently utilized the resources available on the plains.
People had to share food sources with their dogs. Horses, on the other hand, ate the one
thing found in great quantity on the plains – grass. Horses made the Comanche world
28
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smaller. They made warfare bloodier. They provided both a means and a reason for
conducting raids.31
The Comanche alliance had plenty of targets to raid. One was the Santa Fe Trail.
In 1838, Comanches attacked Pecos, New Mexico, so hard that the town depopulated. Its
residents moved back to the relative safety of the Rio Grande Valley. Comanches
frequently raided deeply into Mexico as well. As time went on, their favorite target was
Texas. After they made peace with New Mexico, Texas became the most likely raiding
field. Texas sat on the southern fringe of Comanchería. Its settlements were dispersed
and lightly defended. Neither the Mexican government nor the fledgling Republic of
Texas, created in 1836, could adequately defend the outlying livestock operations.
Farmers and ranchers on the Texas frontier offered a prime selection of horses and cattle
that could be had with little risk.32
Comanches often raided for revenge and retribution as well. The Texas
government only exacerbated that aspect of Comanche violence during its short tenure.
Republic of Texas president Sam Houston, who served from 22 October 1836 to 10
December 1838 and again from 12 December 1841 to 9 December 1844, lived among
Indians for a time during his youth. He was generally sympathetic toward them and
implemented more pacific policies. Mirabeau Lamar, whose term was from 10
December 1838 to 12 December 1841, took a far more aggressive tack during his term.
No one in Texas (except maybe Houston) understood that no single Comanche leader
controlled all bands in the tribe, let alone the entire alliance. These inconsistent policies
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caused nothing but confusion and strained relations. They served to fuel the Plains
tribes’ motivations for raiding the Texas settlements.33
The onset of the Civil War did nothing to alleviate Comanche raiding in Texas.
Initially, the Confederate administration in Texas was able to provide a level of
protection similar to what the U.S. government had offered in the 1850s. But as time
went on Confederate resources dwindled much faster than federal resources. The frontier
of Confederate Texas became even more vulnerable. From the early to mid nineteenth
century, the Comanche alliance evolved toward an almost complete reliance on the
pilfering of Texas to sell to New Mexico. This shifted somewhat in the 1850s and 1860s
when settlers began streaming across the Kansas plains in greater numbers, providing
improved opportunities for looting further north. Commercial and military shipments on
the Santa Fe Trail during the Civil War increased as well, providing lucrative raiding
targets.34
Kiowa Leaders
Since the primary village assaulted by Kit Carson’s force was Kiowa, most of the
Indian leaders known to have been present and active at the Battle of Adobe Walls were
members of that tribe. One-Eyed Bear reportedly led the band of Comanches during the
battle. Iron Shirt was the principle chief of the Kiowa-Apaches. He refused to flee when
Carson’s battalion attacked. He died at the entryway of his lodge.35
Dohasan. Also known as Sierrito or Little Mountain, he served as principle chief
of the Kiowa tribe from 1833-1866. He succeeded A’date (Islandman) following a
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Kiowa massacre at the hands of the Osages. Dohasan was in the upper village at the time
of Carson’s attack and led the defense of the village. He was an old man at the time of
the battle.36
Dohasan was one of a few older chiefs arguing for peace with whites when
Colonel Edwin V. Sumner met with him in 1858. Kiowa chiefs struggled to keep
younger warriors off the warpath. Dohasan’s peaceful position in no way reflected a
sense of defeatism or inferiority to U.S. power. As agent Robert Miller distributed
Kiowa annuity gifts that same year, he warned the Kiowas that if they did not cease their
depredations, the government would not only withhold presents but would send troops to
punish the tribe. Dohasan reportedly leapt to his feet and replied:
The white chief is a fool. He is a coward. His heart is small – not larger
than a pebble stone. His men are not strong – too few to contend against
my warriors. They are women. There are three chiefs – the white chief,
the Spanish chief, and myself. The Spanish chief and myself are men.
We do bad toward each other sometimes, stealing horses and taking
scalps, but we do not get mad and act the fool. The white chief is a child,
and like a child gets mad quick. When my young men, to keep their
women and children from starving, take from the white men passing
through our country, killing and driving away our buffalo, a cup of sugar
or coffee, the white chief is angry and threatens to send his soldiers. I
have looked for them a long time, but they have not come. His heart is a
woman’s. I have spoken. Tell the great white chief what I have said.37
Dohasan was the most powerful Kiowa chief in remembered history. In a
radically democratic and politically eclectic society, he was one of the few plains chiefs
who truly was a “principle chief” – the kind of a single, powerful tribal leader that the
United States government expected to be able to negotiate with. He retained this
venerated status until his death in 1866.38
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Satanta (White Bear). He was born sometime around 1820. For his prowess in
battle during his early life, he achieved the rank of subchief. A doctor visiting the Kiowa
camps to vaccinate the tribe for small pox in 1864 described him as “a fine-looking
Indian, very energetic and as sharp as a brier.” Satanta put on quite a show for the
doctor, who ate three meals a day with the chief. He had carpets for guests to sit on and
used painted fireboards decorated with brass tacks for a table. He sounded a brass
“French horn” to summon diners at mealtime. Most historians believe Satanta blew a
bugle at the First Battle of Adobe Walls. The horn referenced by the doctor may be the
same instrument. 39
No overall chief of the Kiowas succeeded Dohasan. Satanta was probably the
most influential of the subchiefs. He became known as an orator for lengthy speeches he
made while treating for peace. Satanta agreed to both the Little Arkansas and Medicine
Lodge Treaties of 1865 and 1867 respectively. Neither agreement led to permanent
peace.40
Following George Custer’s Washita Campaign in the late fall of 1868, Satanta
and Lone Wolf (another important sub-chief) came in to discuss peace terms with Custer,
who promptly took both chiefs hostage and held them until the Kiowas as a whole
surrendered to reservation life. After his release, Satanta led several major raids,
including the Warren Wagon Train raid in 1871. General William T. Sherman himself
arrested Satanta and Big Tree not long after that raid. A Texas court tried, convicted, and
sentenced them to hang. The Texas governor reduced the sentence to life under pressure
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from a group of Quakers whom President Grant had placed in charge of Indian policy.
The two Kiowas were released after just two years.41
Satanta’s presence at the Second Battle of Adobe Walls violated his parole. He
was again thrown in prison and subjected to forced labor. He lost hope of escaping and
became increasingly sullen. He committed suicide by throwing himself out of an upstairs
prison hospital window on October 11, 1878.42
Satank (Sitting Bear). He was another Kiowa subchief. Satank instigated
(perhaps inadvertently) one of the raids on Fort Larned that drew General Carleton’s
military response in 1864. Like Satanta, he signed the Medicine Lodge Treaty. He
participated with Satanta in the Warren Wagon Train Massacre. However, after he was
arrested, he freed himself from his bonds and launched a suicide attack on the guards. He
was shot to death by his army guards on June 8, 1871.43
Weapons and Tactics
Many Plains tribes were well armed by the mid 1860s. Comanches and Kiowas
had excellent access to firearms based on their long-running and prolific trade with New
Mexico, and to a lesser extent with the Mandan and Hidatsa villages to the north. Carson
reported that every Indian he fought at Adobe Walls was armed with a rifle. He was
nearly certain that the Indians he fought had acquired their weapons and ammunition
from Comanchero traders within the preceding week and a half. This angered Carson
and Carleton. The general had ordered a halt to all trading passes following the summer
raids. Superintendent Steck had apparently ignored the edict and allowed traders to pass
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into the Southern Plains. They armed the Kiowas and Comanches whom Carson
fought.44
Firearms played a key role in Plains Indian warfare, but in many situations Indian
tactics favored the bow. Muskets provided an advantage in range over the bow when
fired from a fixed defensive position, but the bow and arrow provided a much faster rate
of fire and were exponentially easier to fire from horseback. Indian warfare relied
heavily on mobility, and firearms often did not fit well into their tactics. Firearms
undoubtedly increased the effectiveness of the Indian skirmishers at Adobe Walls, but the
mounted warriors probably used a combination of the two weapons.45
In addition to firearms and bows, the Indian combatants at Adobe Walls would
also have carried decorated shields crafted from several layers of buffalo hide from the
shoulder of the animal, the toughest part of the hide. They carried lances designed to be
thrust from under the arm. They also generally carried flint war clubs or battle axes.
These weapons weighed about two pounds, were a little over a foot long, and had a sixinch-long head that tapered from about three inches to one inch in width from front to
back. Although it had little long-range use, the war club could be a deadly short-range
weapon.46
In war or battle, Plains Indians depended heavily upon maintaining the initiative
to achieve military success. They carefully chose their fights and usually waged an
offensive battle. Comanches and Kiowas raided on moonlit nights. If they struck during
the day, it was to surprise outmanned parties or widely scattered settlements unlikely to
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mount adequate resistance. They relied on surprise and shock, and tended to fight only
when facing extremely favorable conditions. They seldom fought pitched battles like
those the army preferred, unless they held some significant tactical advantage.47
When unable to surprise an enemy, they might send forth a small party, mounted
on their fastest horses, in an attempt to draw the enemy into an ambush. They would
shout with a fierce cry and make a sudden, ferocious charge with the goal of scaring the
enemy into flight and turning the odds drastically in their favor.48
The Comanches and Kiowas did not always surprise or run off foes. When forced
to fight a formidable, alert foe, or stage a defense as they did at Adobe Walls, drew upon
a different set of tactics. They would initially form a mounted wedge, charging toward
the enemy. Once within relatively close range, the riders would shift to a wheeling circle
sometimes more than one rider deep. Each revolution came closer to the enemy, and
warriors ducked under the necks of their horses to fire their guns or bows as their side of
the wheel neared the desired target. They used the leeward side of the circle to reload.49
Defensive tactics did not escape the Comanches and Kiowas. At Adobe Walls,
they likely utilized the above wheeling tactic while in close contact with Carson’s troops.
After abandoning the upper village, they employed a slow fighting retreat, exchanging
ground for time. Plains Indians seldom stood their ground against a concerted charge.
They sought to retain freedom of movement and keep losses at a sustainable level. When
charged, their skirmish line would drift away and reform farther back or on a flank either
to press an enemy there or to bide time and reform at a further defensible position.50
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Exchanging territory for time and mobility would have been the most logical Indian
response to Carson’s advance.
Camp positioning also figured into Plain Indian defensive tactics. Camp
placement varied from tribe to tribe. Comanches and Kiowas uniquely preferred their
campsites near running water and in open timber where available. They sought areas
protected by a canyon, arroyo, or some kind of escarpment. This allowed some wind
protection, access to feed and game, wood, and a reasonable opportunity to avoid being
surprised by an enemy. All these elements factored into the selection of this site on the
Canadian for the winter camps in late 1864.51
Pressures on the Comanches and Kiowas
Plains tribes all felt a pinch on their resources by the late 1850s. Their adaptation
to the horse culture brought more tribes to the plains and demanded more horses than the
area had seen or supported before. Plains tribes’ collective harvesting of the buffalo
herds had already diminished the size of the herds. Emigrants flooding westward further
depleted resources – not just grass and game but also wood along streams. Possession of
land was important, but it was outside threats to the resources tied to the land they
controlled that pressured Plains Indians most.52
Kiowa and Comanche leaders certainly gave off impression that they were
intimidated by U.S. military might on the plains, but they must have begun to feel
pressure from U.S. military presence by the late 1850s. Perhaps they only begrudged the

51

Ruff to Maury, 30 July 1860, R/21 LR, 1860, DNM, r. 12, M1120, RG 393, NA; Wallace and Hoebel,
The Comanches, 14-15.
52
West, Contested Plains, 51-53, 68, 88-90.

64

army the resources consumed by its men and horses. More likely, though, U.S. cavalry
threatened their security.53
By 1858, the army had placed more effective leadership on the frontier. Cavalry
effectively struck the Comanches north of the Red River an unprecedented three times
that year. This combined with the strain on resources began to split Indian parties up into
smaller groups, making it more difficult for older chiefs favoring peace to control
younger, more militant warriors. Most importantly, though, these army missions in 1858
provided the first hints that the army was willing to penetrate previously uncontested
Comanche territory. The Llano Estacado remained a safe haven, but the army showed it
could and would march deeply into Comanche country. The 1858 campaigns did not
conquer nor show mastery. But they must have made Indians in the region feel pressured
and uneasy, and may have driven them toward more aggressive responses.54
For decades, European presence on the periphery of Comanche and Kiowa
territory had provided a lucrative raiding and trading market. But never before had such
volumes of people paraded through and around their territory. The increased presence
and traffic presented more opportunities for raiding, but also challenged their access to
resources and in the long term threatened their way of life. These latter threats only gave
further motivation to raid. Raiding served many functions – honor, profit, retribution,
and warning. It is no wonder raiding increased in the period leading up to 1864.
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4. Carleton’s Strategy & Carson’s Campaign
The Winter Campaign
General Carleton and Kit Carson faced challenges that had burdened U.S. Army
officers trying to prosecute campaigns against the Indian tribes of the Great Plains
throughout the 1850s. The fact that Plains tribes were able continually and consistently
to exploit their few tactical advantages testified to their creativity and tactical prowess.
Plains tribes showed an exceptional aptitude for adaptation. Repeatedly, they engaged
Angloamerican troops equipped with vastly superior technology and firepower with
success that frustrated American troops for decades.
The U.S. Cavalry plodded about the plains like a clumsy heavyweight fighting the
nimble, flyweight Indians. The U.S. usually brought more firepower to a fight than any
single band or collaboration of Indians. Indian tactical mobility time and again rendered
the army’s superior firepower useless. Internal confusion over U.S. Indian war strategy
did not help.
Indians generally avoided direct conflict, with two exceptions. They would attack
or fight if they held an advantage in numbers or firepower that virtually assured success.
For instance, they were amenable to attacking individuals, small parties, or green settlers
who would not likely be able to mount a sufficient defense. Indians would also fight if
cornered or trapped. If their families were threatened by an imminent attack on their
village, they would sometimes join pitched battle until their dependents were safe or had
escaped.1 Both of the above elements came into play at the Battle of the Little Bighorn,
where Custer’s attack placed the Sioux villages and families at risk, forcing the warriors
to fight. At the same time, Custer’s Sioux opponents vastly outnumbered his assault
1
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force. The Sioux also had the better firearms than their Seventh Cavalry assailants.
Many Sioux had repeating rifles, while the Seventh Cavalry fought primarily with singleshot breach-loaders.2
Plains tribes consistently used superior mobility to frustrate army attempts at
engaging Indians in pitched battles. Since most Plains tribes followed the buffalo, their
societies were naturally mobile. This proved helpful for defense both against the army
and rival plains tribes. Army leaders could not plan to take strategic “points,” such as
cities or lines of communication, because Plains Indian societies were not tied to such
static formations. With significant warning, a Plains village could be dismantled and its
inhabitants vacated long before the army ever struck.3
In summer 1860, the Comanches repeatedly flustered Major Charles F. Ruff, who
commanded a 225-man scout force intended to strike a blow in the Canadian River
region. Ruff’s troops, a force of Mounted Riflemen, came upon a Comanche village of
about three hundred people along the Canadian River. Ruff’s regulars surprised the
village. But the Indians fled with what they could easily carry, shooing along the
livestock.
The Comanches bolted in three different directions. A main party of warriors,
about eighty to one hundred, broke one way. A dozen and a half drove the village’s herd
of five hundred or so livestock in another. The remainder of the populace, primarily
women, children, and elders, took off in a third.4
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This tactic employed by the Comanches against Ruff’s cavalry had its risks. They
left their entire herd of livestock lightly protected. They also left the women and children
at risk. And of course, any hope of protecting the valuable goods that could not be
brought along from the village was lost. Eventually, the cavalry did make it back to the
abandoned village and destroyed most of the property.5
While they lost many possessions when Ruff’s troops burned their lodges, the
Comanches’ tactics were largely successful. The entire populace escaped, and they left
the army’s horses in such poor condition that further pursuit was impossible for quite
some time. Ruff said of the encounter, “The Indians abandoned everything, (and)
separated into three parties. We took the direction of the warriors of the party and
pursued them for 12 miles, most of the time under full run, over a high prairie. It soon
became apparent that the Indian horses ‘out footed’ our animals, and that unless they
chose, we could not come up with them. It was in fact marvelous that our poor broken
down horses were able to keep up the killing pace for the distance they did.”6
The Indian warriors probably could have further “out footed” the Mounted
Riflemen. The Comanches allowed the Ruff’s troops to remain close, stringing out the
pursuit and drawing the cavalry further away from their women, children, elders, and
livestock while allowing the warrior party to keep eye contact with the riflemen and
ensure that they did not break off to pursue one of the other fleeing Comanche
contingents. The scheme worked masterfully. Ruff claimed it was “soon apparent” that
he would not be able to overtake the warriors, but was still following the Indian decoy
twelve miles later. Twelve miles at a dead run would kill most horses.
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This same game of cat and mouse occurred at least three times during Ruff’s
scout. Each time Ruff’s prey split up, and each time he was unable to run down the
warrior party. Once, during the night, the Indians mounted their own attack. It was
daylight before the cavalry could respond. By then, pursing the Comanches was futile.
Although Ruff blamed his repeated failure to corner the Comanches and Kiowas on a
lack of competent guides, it seems doubtful that he would have been any more successful
unless he explored different tactical pursuit options.7
Of the three basic nineteenth-century army units – infantry, artillery, and cavalry
– cavalry was by far the most mobile. But even U.S. cavalry was no match for the
mobility of the Plains tribes. U.S. cavalry horses were large, sturdy animals, capable of
carrying a rider and his field kit, together weighing about 350 pounds.8 Such horses, like
the men who rode them, could not survive on the plains without a supply line. They
simply were not incapable of indefinitely “living off the land.”9 Ruff’s mounted scout
encountered this problem. He found that summer rains on the Southern Plains did not
support sufficient grass to keep his horses strong. His men wound up “dragging their
exhausted horses, in the hottest of days.”10
Indian ponies were smaller than American dragoon or cavalry horses and
incapable of bearing the heavy loads the army demanded of its mounts. But they did not
need to. Indian ponies could bear a warrior and thrive on prairie grass. A cavalry unit
involved in a long chase across the prairies was usually tied to a cumbersome supply train
or static post whose rations and forage were needed for men and stock. Indians and their
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mounts could live off the land and were therefore more mobile and flexible than mounted
army units. If they did not want to confront the cavalry, they did not have to.
Captain Kirby Smith, famous more for his career as a Confederate general than
for his service in the antebellum army, summed up the challenge of operating on the
plains. After six weeks of chasing Comanche chief Sanico around the upper drainage of
the Brazos and Colorado Rivers, he lamented, “As has been the case with all large
expeditions against the nomadic tribes on our western prairies, we traveled through the
country, broke down our men, killed our horses, and returned as ignorant of the
whereabouts of Mr. Sanico as when we started.”11
If U.S. forces were to subdue the Plains tribes, they had to devise a way to
convince them to capitulate. The army could either remove Indian ability to survive or
their ability to resist. Thus the U.S. army developed the tactic of the winter campaign,
first demonstrated by Colonel William S. Harney in 1855. During the winter, tribes were
less mobile than they were during spring, summer, or fall. This time of year, they lived
in fixed villages in river valleys and relied heavily on shelter and stored food supplies.
Plains Indians were vulnerable to plodding U.S. cavalry attacks during the winter.
Kit Carson himself directed one of the first winter campaigns, albeit not against a
plains tribe. During the winter of 1863-1864, he prosecuted a destructive war against the
Navajo Nation in present-day western New Mexico and eastern Arizona. Citizens of
New Mexico had been complaining for years about Navajo raiding. This conflict
between the Navajos and the Spanish, and later the Mexicans had been going on for two
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centuries.12 When the United States occupied New Mexico in 1846, Brigadier General
Stephen W. Kearny promised to put an end to the Navajo trouble.13 General Carleton
planned to fulfill Kearny’s promise in 1863.
Carleton ordered the Navajos to surrender by July 20, 1863, and prepare for
transportation to Bosque Redondo or face total annihilation. Few if any Navajos
responded to the initial surrender demand. Carleton then sent Carson into Navajo country
with orders to kill the men and capture the women and children. Carson’s winter
campaign impoverished and terrorized the Navajos, convincing thousands to surrender
and walk to Bosque Redondo.
Carson made his way through Navajo country utilizing the kind of scorched earth
tactics General Sherman would use the following year against the southern white
population in Georgia. Carson’s men destroyed Navajo corn crops and burned hogans.
Carson’s command even penetrated Canyon de Chelly, the ancient Navajo stronghold,
undoubtedly leaving Navajos with the impression that no place was safe. Contrary to
precedent, Carleton allowed Utes, Pueblos, and Nuevo Mexicanos to harass the Navajos
as well. Starving and defeated, the Navajos surrendered.14
After the recent success of the winter campaign against the Navajos, Carleton
sought to employ similar tactics against the Comanches and Kiowas the following winter.
The winter campaign would allow Kit Carson’s command to locate a concentrated group
of Kiowas, Comanches, and Plains Apaches. The winter strike also enabled Carson to
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catch them in a less mobile state. However, it brought about other consequences
resulting in an outcome far different than that achieved in the Navajo campaign.
“Adobe Walls” in the Canadian Valley
Carson planned from the outset to use a place he knew as Fort Adobe for his base
of operations against the Kiowas and Comanches.15 Fort Adobe, or Adobe Walls, served
as a landmark for travelers through an area noted for its lack of them. North of present
day Amarillo, the Canadian River cuts a gash through the high plains caprock. Down in
that gash stood a set of Adobe Walls. These walls were all that was left of an abandoned
trading operation that had been attempted by the same outfit that ran the much betterknown Bent’s Fort along the Arkansas River in present-day southeastern Colorado in the
early and mid 1800s.
Bent, St. Vrain, and Company established Fort Adobe in the mid 1840s as a
satellite of their main trading enterprise at Bent’s Fort. The post sat about ten miles east
of present-day Stinnett and Borger, north of Amarillo in the Texas Panhandle. The Bent
brothers had attempted to establish trade with the Comanches and Kiowas as early as the
late 1820s.16
These tribes made operations for Bent, St. Vrain, and Company treacherous
almost from the outset. The company apparently built a log structure in the vicinity in
the early years and assigned Ceran St. Vrain to run the post. Comanches and Kiowas
eventually ran off every single animal St. Vrain had in his possession. Stranded and
desperate, he resorted to some crafty, if morally questionable, tactics. Under a white flag,
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he assembled the tribal leaders in his wooden stockade. He locked the doors and held
them under arms, threatening to kill the lot of them if their tribes did not return his stock
and grant him safe passage back to Bent’s Fort.17
Questionable or not, the tactics worked. St. Vrain escaped with his stock and his
skin. When the company sought to reestablish trade from its post on the Canadian
sometime in the mid 1840s, Bent and St. Vrain sent out Mexican adobe builders to create
a more stout and defensible position. The adobe structure, nine feet high and eighty feet
square, was aptly named Fort Adobe.18
The enterprise at Fort Adobe never turned enough profit to balance the constant
Indian trouble faced by this remote outpost in the Canadian valley. Comanche and
Kiowa raids continued to plague Fort Adobe. In 1848, the company sent Kit Carson with
a small party of four old mountain men and two Mexicans – a cook and a herder – to
reestablish the trade. Almost as soon as they arrived, Jicarilla Apaches killed the herder
and drove off the entire herd of livestock, save two mules that happened to be tied up
inside the adobe post. Absence of stock led Carson and company to cache what trappings
they had acquired so far and return to Bent’s Fort. A Kiowa party noticed this small
party of traders walking across the plains on their return trip to Bent’s and attacked.
Carson’s party formed up around the two remaining mules. They used a circularly
rotating firing pattern to hold off the Indian attackers. The Kiowas called off the assault
after losing three warriors – too high a price to pay for a couple of mules.19
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Always eager traders, the Comanches convinced William Bent that Kiowas had
been the source of all his trouble around Fort Adobe. They wanted him at least to
continue hauling trade goods from the Arkansas to trade with the Comanches. Bent sent
a party of twelve, this time with Dick Wootton, back to Fort Adobe to retrieve the goods
cached by Carson and to trade with the Comanches. Immediately upon arriving,
Wootton’s party perceived their Comanche trading partners as a threatand let only two or
three into the post at a time. Soon, seeing even this practice as too risky, they cut a hole
in the wall about the size of a train ticket window and conducted all business through the
window. The Comanches took offense at this and commenced taking occasional potshots at the trading window.20 A senior Comanche chief eased tempers, and business was
allowed to continue, although in a very tense environment. Wootton departed with a rich
load of robes and deerskins, but he later recalled, “it was the most hazardous trading
expedition I ever had anything to do with.”21
William Bent himself made a final attempt at salvaging the Canadian River
operation in the spring of 1849. With some ox-drawn wagons he hauled trading goods
for Fort Adobe. Not long afterward, local Indians killed some of his livestock. Bent
must have suspected he would have more trouble after all the precedents. He apparently
also brought with him the means to put an end to Fort Adobe for good if things did not
work out, or so he thought.
Bent eventually gave up on the enterprise, conceding any future trade along the
Canadian to the Comancheros. He set off a huge explosion meant to destroy the outpost,
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and then returned to the relative safety of Bent’s Fort.22 He succeeded only in blasting
down the roof and some of the interior walls. The roofless remains became the landmark
known as Adobe Walls.
Roofless or not, the structure still had some utility in the 1860s. It served as
landmark to Comancheros, and it was stout enough for Carson to plan on using it as a
base. It functioned as a protective corral for Carson’s horses when the fight at Adobe
Walls broke out in 1864.23 In spite of the explosion, much of the structure of the Adobe
Walls seems to have been in good condition as late as 1860. In his report on a scout from
that year, Major Ruff described it. “The ruins of an Adobe Fort, or trading post, a
building of 9 rooms, the walls of seven of which are in good preservation, the west wall
is 100 feet, and the north wall is 180 feet long. Nothing of the wood work of this
building remains.”24
Nothing remains of the structure today.
Operating to Comanche Country from New Mexico
Transporting Colonel Carson’s troops and equipment to the heart of Comanche
country on the Canadian River would prove a difficult task. The idea of the winter
campaign was to strike Indians when mobility was difficult and they were most
dependent upon stationary resources. A hazard of operating on the Plains in the winter
was the likelihood of contending with foul weather and miserable travel conditions.
Adobe Walls was a foreboding place of windblown isolation. Both in terms of
distance and climate, the remains of Fort Adobe sat a world away from the mountains of
Santa Fe. Getting a force of four hundred men from the relative civilization of New
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Mexico to the windswept high plains of Comanche country would be a chore any time of
year. Doing it the winter would be that much harder.
Kit Carson’s expedition embarked from Fort Bascom on the Canadian River near
present day Tucumcari, New Mexico, but most of the troops came from the Santa Fe
area. Several companies under Major McCleave traveled from Fort Union near present
day Pecos, New Mexico, to Fort Bascom before they could depart.25 Carson traveled to
Cimarron, brought Indian auxiliaries from that place, and then rendezvoused with Abreu
and the infantry at Bascom.26
Even with the expedition embarking from Fort Bascom, Carson’s party faced a
two-hundred-mile journey down the Canadian. The region was isolated and barren, no
easy place to lead an expedition. Early frontiersmen knew the Canadian River for its
unpredictability. It was thought to be either a dry streambed (unhelpful for watering
stock and troops) or a raging torrent.27
November was not the season for raging torrents. It was, however, a season of
heavy snows. Kiowas called the winter of 1864-1865 the “muddy traveling winter.”28
Twice during Carson’s party’s descent of the Canadian Valley, short but severe
snowstorms delayed travel and made movement difficult and miserable.29
As with previous expeditions against Plains tribes, Carson faced the logistical
problem of how to supply hundreds of troops and horses in inhospitable territory. He
originally planned to bring along a massive mule train. Since there were only one
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hundred pack saddles available, he abandoned that plan in favor of supply wagons. His
column would march with the supply wagons as far as Fort Adobe, and then use the
remains of that place as an operating base. In preparation to outfit Carson’s force, the
quartermaster at Fort Bascom received 27 wagons and an ambulance on November 4.30
Carson’s battalion departed Fort Bascom on 12 November 1864. The party had
some difficulty crossing the Canadian from south to north. Once across, the column
utilized an established wagon road on the north bank of the river. The wagon road was
no longer an active immigrant trail or a venue for large scale commercial trade and
shipping like the Santa Fe Trail. The road had been established by Comanchero traders
doing business with the Indians. 31
The strike force camped the first night out of Fort Bascom camped at Ute Creek
just west of the Texas line. Within a few days, the party passed near the location of
Carson’s failed attempt to rescue Ann White. Many troops in Carson’s party likely knew
the story. Jicarilla Apaches had captured White in 1849 when they raided a wagon train
just outside Fort Union. Carson was commissioned to guide a rescue party. He struggled
greatly to keep the trail, but after several days his party made contact with the Jicarillas.
A brief disagreement ensued between Carson and the army officer commanding the
pursuit as to how they should proceed. In the meantime, the Jicarilla captors killed White
and her young child. Obviously, this was a traumatic emotional moment for Carson. His
feelings were intensified by the fact that his party found a paperback novel featuring
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Carson among White’s effects. Thoughts of White holding out false hope that Carson
would rescue her plagued Kit for the rest of his years.32
On reaching the site, Carson related the details of the event to his accompanying
troops. Revisiting the site must have been painful for Carson, but hearing him retell the
already legendary tale certainly made an impression on the junior officers of the
expedition. Lieutenant George Pettis recalled in his memoir, “Carson explained to us
how their attack was made, the position of the Indian camp, where the bodies were found,
etc., in his usual graphic manner.” Interestingly, Pettis remembered the perpetrators in
the story to be the Comanches his party was pursuing on this trip rather than the
Jicarillas, who happened to be serving as his party’s auxiliaries.33
Pettis’ other main entertainment during the eastbound trip came from the Ute and
Jicarilla Apache auxiliaries. Each night upon making camp, the accompanying Indians
engaged in what Pettis described as a war dance. Although initially interesting to the
curios officer, several evenings the Indians dancing prevented him from getting a good
night’s sleep.34
On about the fifteenth, Carson’s command camped at Cañada de los Ruedes, or
“Wheel Canyon.” A legend stated that this place had an ample supply of large
cottonwoods and that, it had been a stopping point for Mexican traders on the way to or
from Missouri in the days before the main Santa Fe route on the Arkansas and Cimarron
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Rivers came into use. The trees made the stop a convenient place to repair ox-cart
components.35
As they proceeded west, Carson employed prudent tactics to ensure the practical
safety of travel and to discover the Comanches and Kiowas before they discovered him,
hopefully preventing the usual game of chase. Each day, Carson dispatched two of his
scouts several hours in advance of the main party. These scouts would return in the
evening to report any findings. He additionally deployed scouts well out on each flank.36
Early in the afternoon of November 24, Carson camped his party at Arroyo de la
Mula (Mule Springs or Mule Creek) about thirty miles west of old Fort Adobe. The main
contingent ate its supper around sunset. Some were doing camp chores, some sleeping,
others gambling. Suddenly, the auxiliaries leapt to their feet. The scouts dispatched that
morning were faintly visible, some two miles distant. Lieutenant Pettis could not spot
them without assistance. By some signal, they had conveyed to the rest of the auxiliary
force that the Comanches had been located.
Once back in camp, the scouts relayed to Carson that about ten miles downstream
they had located a sizeable camp of Comanches and Kiowas. Signs indicated a large
body of Indians and a large herd of livestock. Carson’s scouts assured him, “We would
have no difficulty in finding all the Indians that we desired.”37 That prediction turned out
to be true – and then some. Finding the mobile Plains tribes was often difficult, but by
engineering a campaign during the cold season, Carleton and Carson successfully located
the Comanches and Kiowas in even greater numbers than they had expected or prepared
for.
35
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5. The Battle of Adobe Walls
The First Village
The evening of 24 November 1864, Kit Carson and a force of just over four
hundred made camp at Arroyo de la Mula, a few miles upstream from Bent’s abandoned
Adobe Walls trading post and out of the main valley of the Canadian. Carson had sent
two scouts from his Ute and Jicarilla Apache auxiliary force forward that morning, as he
did each day, to observe what lay ahead and report evidence of any Kiowa and Comanche
presence.1
Carson’s expedition had marched through snow and mud for two weeks. His men
wanted to find the Indians, punish them, and return comfortable winter accommodations.
That evening, Carson’s scouts brought back the anticipated news, which inspired a flurry
of excitement. The scouts discovered signs of an Indian presence ten to fifteen miles
downstream from the present federal camp. The evidence indicated a large body of
Indians and an even larger herd of livestock. The Ute and Jicarilla auxiliaries would have
all the livestock they could drive off and Carson would find all the Indians he or Carleton
desired.2
Carson immediately threw his subordinates into action. He ordered all the
wagons loaded for easy defense and left them under the protection of Lieutenant Colonel
Abreu’s force of infantry and dismounted cavalry (about seventy-five men). Carson
directed Abreu and the infantry to remain in camp that evening, and then start after the
remainder of the strike force the morning of the twenty-fifth. Carson moved out with the
Pettis, Kit Carson’s Fight, 12-15; Carson to Cutler, 4 December 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, p. 940.
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entire mounted force along with Lieutenant Pettis and the mountain howitzers in the
fading light of dusk that same evening.3
The remaining combined strike force – now about 350 cavalry and auxiliaries
with the artillery pieces4 – marched through the night under strict orders not to talk,
smoke, or create any other disturbance that might give away Carson’s location and ruin
the surprise. At midnight, the column descended from the rugged edge of the caprock
escarpment into the lowlands of the Canadian Valley.5
Once in the bottoms, Carson’s command ran across fresh signs of the large Indian
party. Carson knew the enemy was near but did not know its precise location. Rather
than stumbling onto them, he immediately halted his party and again dispatched scouts.
Carson’s men dismounted and stood next to their horses, shivering as a heavy frost fell.
They remained alert, awaiting further instructions.6
The scouts returned in the first light of dawn on the twenty-fifth, reporting the
enemy camp still some distance off. Carson’s column resumed its silent march. Orders,
if absolutely necessary, were relayed with a whisper. Carson led from the front, riding
with his experienced Ute and Jicarilla auxiliaries. The Indians crept down the valley,
perched atop their horses. They curled their legs curled beneath buffalo robes to stay out
of the biting late-November wind. A couple of cavalry companies followed the Indians.
Lieutenant George Pettis and his howitzers came next, tucked safely in the center of the
procession. The remaining cavalry served as the rear guard.7
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A couple of hours into their march, Carson heard a voice calling from across the
river, “Viene aca! Viene aca!” (Come here! Come here!). He had come across what
was either something akin to a Kiowa picket, or just some younger men of the tribe out
rounding up their horses before breakfast. A quick signal to Major McCleave sent him,
Captain Charles Deus, and Company M, First Cavalry, New Mexico Volunteers (seventyone men in all) splashing across the shallow Canadian in a desperate attempt to intercept
the three enemy Indians before they could alert the balance of their village to the
presence of the column.8
At the prospect of battle with their long-time rivals, the Comanches, Carson’s Ute
and Jicarilla auxiliaries dove into a brush thicket and emerged just as fast, painted and
ready for action. Carson spotted an enemy village, still about five miles distant and
ordered the column forward. He sent Company B, First Cavalry, California Volunteers
(60 men) under Captain Fritz ahead to strike the village in cooperation with McCleave’s
force on the opposite bank of the river.9
Carson appears to have been attempting to maintain surprise by striking with the
most mobile part of his force. Although he would later be quite relieved to have the
howitzers along, at this point they inhibited a rapid advance. The mountain howitzers
had small wheels that made dragging them through the high grass and occasional brush
thickets of the Canadian River bottom difficult and time consuming. Pettis’s crews had
to take special care not to overturn the undercarriages in haste, since righting them would
cost him even more time. The gun crews could not bring mounts, slowing things down
even further. Even if they had, the guns carriages themselves could not advance at the
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speed of a man on horseback. Carson, however, could not leave them unguarded. He
had no choice but to plod along, hoping McCleave’s horsemen would impede the Indian
pickets’ ability to notify the village of his approach.10
Carson and several companies of cavalry remained with the artillery. Once out of
the thickets, progress improved somewhat. But the diverse units in the command
progressed at different speeds, hindering steady and even advance. Like an inchworm,
they bulged and stretched across the valley floor trying not to get too far behind the
advance cavalry. “Trot, march!” would come the order. The cavalry guard would
advance with the horse-drawn gun carriages, as the gun crews – traveling afoot – scurried
along behind, trailing across the prairie. Then the order, “Walk, march!” allowed the
pedestrian gun crews to catch up. As soon as the horseless men caught their breath, off
went the horses again.11
Before long, high grass and divergent travel speeds prevented Carson and Pettis
from maintaining visual contact with the advanced cavalry. They never got out of
earshot. Shots rang out in the distance, and Carson knew the battle was underway. He
ordered Lieutenant Heath and his command, a detachment of thirty-eight men of
Company K, First Cavalry, California Volunteers, into the fray. They charged ahead in
pursuit of Fritz’s company as Carson, his ungainly howitzer crews, and their cavalry
escort labored along in the rear.12
The valley widened to about two miles as Carson’s party approached the Kiowa
village he had seen in the distance. Kiowas had been grazing their cattle and horses in
the lush bottomlands. Upon discovering these choice livestock prizes, Carson’s Ute and
Pettis, Kit Carson’s Fight, 18.
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Jicarilla allies began rounding up Kiowa livestock. The intrepid auxiliaries would ride
into a group of Kiowa animals and identify a fine horse from the group. They would leap
on the back of the fresh animal for use in the upcoming battle, while substituting their
exhausted mounts as claim markers. The idea was to return later and take possession of
the herds they had “liberated.”13
The cavalry strike force under McCleave and Fritz successfully surprised the
Kiowa village, which contained approximately 150 lodges. The warriors of the village
rushed to its defense. Stumbling Bear, a respected warrior in the tribe, knocked a soldier
and a Ute off of their horses. Lean Bear charged into the fray, singing the war song of
the Tonkonko military order. He was honor bound to kill at least one enemy before
fleeing. A Kiowa-Apache who happened to be in the village at the time of the attack was
knocked off his horse by a Ute ball. The Ute dove from his horse and captured the
Kiowa-Apache warrior’s war bonnet, a fine trophy.14
The warriors held off the approaching cavalry long enough to allow most of the
noncombatants to evacuate while they gathered up their weapons. The Kiowa women and
children scrambled to the relative safety of the breaks in the caprock, sheltering a handful
of white captives from Carson’s detection. A small boy named Setkopte grabbed his
younger brother’s hand and ran in desperation after his mother. She flung a baby on her
back and scooped another in her arms and they all fled for the escarpment.15
Dohasan, the renowned but aging Kiowa chief, leapt to his horse and sped
downstream to alert other allied Indian camps. When he arrived, his horse foamed with a
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mixture of sweat and flecks of blood. Upon hearing his warning, the men of the lower
village galloped their horses upstream to join in the defense, while the women, children,
and aged fled to safety in the breaks.16
After the Kiowa warriors departed the upper village, a few Ute women who made
the trip rifled through the lodges seeking what plunder they could acquire. They found
four ancient Kiowa men – two blind and two crippled – who could not evacuate with the
young and the healthy. The Ute women split their skulls with axes, perhaps as part of the
custom of mutilation of enemy bodies prevalent in some Native American cultures.17
After abandoning the village, the Comanche and Kiowa warriors inched backward
down the Canadian, contesting the federal advance every step of the four miles between
the upper village and the old Adobe Walls ruins. The artillery and its guard filtered
between the abandoned Kiowa lodges. At the abandoned trading post, the warriors made
a stand that stymied the U.S. cavalry advance.18
The advance cavalry loosed their horses and corralled them in the Adobe Walls
ruins, the walls of which were still high enough and sound enough to adequately protect
the animals. The dismounted cavalry deployed around the ruins as skirmishers. The first
Kiowa and Comanche assaults on McCleave’s position occurred before Carson arrived
with the artillery and its guard. Once within about a thousand yards, Carson had the
engagement in plain sight. He and the remaining cavalry charged into the fray, with
Pettis’ guns rumbling along behind.19
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Comanche and Kiowa warriors galloped by in their wedge and wheel formation.
The warriors laid over or ducked under the necks and backs of their ponies to fire as they
passed at a full run – some with bows, some with firearms. The auxiliaries zipped to and
fro, screaming war cries and firing into the circling enemy. Skirmishers lay here and
there, prone in the grass, firing when they could get a clear shot.20
Shortly after Pettis arrived with the howitzers, the Kiowas and Comanches
appeared to be massing for a charge. Carson deployed the guns atop a small, thirty-foot
hill that rose within a hundred yards of the ruins. Kiowas and Comanches must have
looked on in wonder as the federals unlimbered their strange looking guns. “Pettis, throw
a few shell into that crowd over thar,” hollered Carson. With a quick salute Pettis
wheeled and called out, “Battery, halt! Action, right! Load with shell, load!” Within a
few seconds the guns were loaded and sighted. “Number one, FIRE! Number two,
FIRE!”21
The opposing Indians peered at the strange weapon in astonishment and began a
retreat back down the Canadian toward the upper village that Dohasan had visited for
reinforcements. This village was not yet known to Carson and company. By the time
Pettis fired his fourth shot, not a Kiowa or Comanche was in the outermost range of his
guns. It seemed the howitzers had done their duty. Thinking the battle was over, Carson
called in the skirmishers, unsaddled the cavalry horses, and directed that they be watered.
He allowed his exhausted troops – they had been up all night and had not eaten since the
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previous evening – to rest and breakfast. After a brief hiatus, Carson planned to go back
upstream and destroy the abandoned Kiowa village.22
McCleave and the cavalry found a cool, clear stream nearby and let the horses
drink their fill, then tied them off on pickets to browse the lush prairie grass of the
bottomland. The men rummaged through their haversacks to mine bits of bacon and
hardtack, probably relieved at having come through the day’s fighting unscathed.23
Carson soon discovered that this peace and quiet marked only the eye of the
storm, rather than its passing. Through his spyglass he observed over a thousand warriors
making their way back toward the Adobe Walls with a renewed sense of urgency. A
village of at least 350 lodges lay down stream beyond them. Carson threw his command
back into action. The cavalry saddled their horses and drove them back into the ruins.
Pettis prepared his artillery to renew the battle. Again, the cavalry deployed prone in the
tall grass, fighting as skirmishers.24
After abandoning their upper village and valiantly contesting the federal advance
until grinding it to a halt at the ruins, the Kiowas had initially backed away out of artillery
range. They did this not to retreat or give up the fight but to secure aid from the lower
villages before continuing the engagement. The lower villages probably housed more
Kiowas, and their allies the Comanches and Kiowa-Apaches. Carson believed the larger
part of his foes at Adobe Walls was Kiowa, with a few Comanches, Plains Apaches, and
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Arapahoes cooperating. Historical consensus is that Carson’s opponents that day were
largely Kiowas and Comanches, possibly accompanied by a few Kiowa-Apaches.25
Dohasan led the Kiowa effort at Adobe Walls, probably assisted by Satanta and
Satank. It would be a misrepresentation to say that any of these fine warriors and leaders
actually “commanded” the Kiowa and Comanche forces, however. Plains tribes operated
in a radically independent, democratic structure that precluded the selection of a single
commander in the same sense the term is applied to the armies of Europe and other
Western societies.26
The composite Plains Indian force was a formidable one, whatever its precise
composition. At least a thousand Kiowas and Comanches made the afternoon assault on
Carson’s party,27 again somewhat confined to the area around the ruins of the abandoned
trading post. The warriors in this larger Indian force brought their best and freshest
mounts. The Indian force at Adobe Walls was the largest to ever face the U.S. army,
other than the Sioux at Little Bighorn. They fought shrewdly. The majority of the Indian
combatants formed what amounted to light cavalry, sporting their finest and most
brilliant war dress. They made frequent charges across the front of the federal skirmish
line – left to right, then right to left. They took cover behind the bodies of their mounts,
firing under their necks and over their backs. Like the U.S. dismounted cavalry, the
Indians deployed skirmishers. These skirmishers laid flat to the ground hidden amongst
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the high clumps of grass, taking shots at the U.S. troops. The idea behind this
deployment may have been for the mounted warriors to inflict what damage they could
while drawing fire and helping to expose the location of hidden U.S. skirmishers. This
would seem to have given the Indian skirmishers improved firing possibilities.28
The Plains Indian force had learned quickly from its initial experience with Pettis’
mountain howitzers. When the warriors renewed combat after the initial engagement,
they refrained from operating in masses that would be vulnerable to artillery fire. In this
phase of the conflict, Carson and Pettis used the howitzers when they could, which was
not often.29 While this adjustment in Indian tactics certainly reduced the effectiveness of
the U.S. artillery, it also prevented the Kiowas and Comanches from massing for charges
that may have overwhelmed the much smaller federal force.
The Plains Indians at Adobe Walls had another fascinating tactical trick up their
collective sleeves. One of their number had at some point captured and learned to play
an army bugle. Pettis reports that about a quarter of a mile distant from the main body of
federal troops, an Indian stood on a small hill. Throughout the battle he would
periodically sound his bugle. The bugler may well have been Satanta himself. He was
known to have a bugle he sounded on stately occasions. Remarkably, the bugler
consistently issued calls countermanding the signals being used to command the U.S.
dismounted cavalry skirmish line. When the U.S. bugler signaled advance, the Indian
bugler called retreat, and vice versa. Pettis seems to suggest that the Indian bugler was
issuing commands to his own side. The Indian bugle signals could also have been an
attempt to confuse U.S. forces. In any case, the event is remarkable. In order to
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successfully order his own troops or confuse his enemies, the Indian bugler needed more
than just possession of an army bugle. He must have known the meanings of the signals
as well. The Indian bugler played his calls so crisply and accurately that Carson believed
there must have been a white man blowing the horn in the enemy camp. There is no
evidence to suggest any non-Indian participation on the side of the Comanches and
Kiowas. Whatever the purpose of the Indian bugler, he added a fascinating element to
the battle – one that intrigued many on Carson’s side of the fighting that day. 30
As Indian warriors fell injured or killed during the course of the battle, their
comrades swept in to remove the casualty from the field to prevent him from falling into
enemy hands. On one occasion, a federal artillery shell scored a direct hit on an Indian
pony, killing the horse and throwing its rider. As the dazed Indian lay helplessly on the
ground, two of his brothers in arms galloped their mounts to his aid. They split paths
around the downed man. Each of the riders draped himself over the back of his horse and
grabbed an arm of the injured man as they sped past, dragging him to safety amidst a
flurry of army rifle rounds. Pettis observed the execution of this Plains warrior custom
several times throughout the afternoon.31
The afternoon wore on and Carson’s party fended off the passing assaults of his
Indian enemies. It became apparent to both sides that the situation would not be resolved
with a sudden, dramatic, aggressive assault. Carson’s artillery prevented the Plains
warriors from mounting an overwhelming charge, and Carson lacked the manpower to
capture or decisively defeat the massive Indian force he had discovered. The Indian force
did not completely abandon the present fight, but took positions just out of gun range and
Pettis, Kit Carson’s Fight, 28-29; Mooney, Calendar History, 317
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seemed content with the possibility of bottling Carson’s command in its present position
around the ruins.32
Plains tribes did not normally practice siege warfare, and Carson soon ascertained
their aims. Two to three miles distant, he saw lines of noncombatants flowing past
toward the abandoned village, intent on retrieving the lodges, livestock, and other
possessions they had left behind. He knew immediately his mission required at least an
attempt at preventing these Kiowas and Comanches, whom he was charged with severely
punishing, from recovering all the goods and stock they began the day with. Carson may
have also been concerned for his supply train. The Indians likely did not know of its
existence, but had they discovered it they would have found a ripe plundering opportunity
protected only by the seventy-five infantry and dismounted cavalry left with Lieutenant
Colonel Abreu. Such a loss of both manpower and supplies would cripple U.S. hopes of
near term survival, let alone a safe return to New Mexico.33
Several junior officers lobbied Carson to make a charge at the next downstream
village – a larger settlement of about three hundred fifty lodges – that was visible not far
off.34 Carson found himself in a difficult position. Duty called him onward to destroy
the entire complex of Indian villages. His present position offered the benefits of a safe
place to store his horses, and a small hill useful to his artillery, but he could not stay there
indefinitely. He was divided from his supply train, and if the Indians were allowed to
escape with all of their possessions the entire mission would have been for naught. He
could race the Indians back to the smaller, upper village, confiscate the stock held there,
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and destroy what possessions he could. Then again, this course of action would require
abandoning his defensive positions.
Carson lost no time and set out to destroy the upper Kiowa village before its
inhabitants could return to salvage the lodges and contents. At about half past three, he
ordered the group into a column of fours, with one man in each set of four leading that
element’s horses. He dismounted Fritz and Company B of the First California Cavalry
and sent them into a skirmish line designed to protect his right flank. He ordered
Company M, First California Cavalry and a part of Company M, First New Mexico
Cavalry, with Captains Gilbert T. Witham and Charles Deus respectively, into a similar
formation on his left. Captain Joseph Berney and Lieutenant Sullivan Heath led
Company D, First New Mexico Cavalry and a detachment of Company K, First
California Cavalry into position as rear guard just behind Pettis and the howitzers who
brought up the rear of the column.35
The Kiowa and Comanche warriors read Carson’s intent and mounted their best
effort of the day to buy time for their other villagers to protect their property. Plains
warriors charged the federal rear with an even greater fury. Pettis’ guns were limbered,
making it more time consuming to fire them. The burden of defending the rear of the
column fell to Berney’s skirmish line. The dismounted cavalry proved up to the
challenge. The pressure was great enough for Carson to later report, “For some time I
had serious doubts for the safety of my rear, but the coolness with which they were
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received by Captain Berney’s command, and the steady and constant fire poured into
them, caused them to retire upon every occasion with great slaughter.”36
Dohasan, while leading the Kiowa effort, had a horse shot from under him.
Stumbling Bear led many charges. He wore his daughter’s shawl that day for good luck.
It worked. Stumbling Bear survived the day unscathed. The shawl, however, was riddled
with holes from the fight.37
This hot fighting did not adequately impede the U.S. advance on the upper
village, so the Plains warriors literally turned up the heat on Carson’s command. The
brush, high dry grass, and weeds did slow the column’s advance somewhat. The Indians
saw the slower progress of the troops amidst this vast fuel supply and started a prairie
fire. A brisk east wind (wind is certainly not uncommon in the panhandle) fanned the
flames toward Carson’s rear, sending his skirmishers and the tail end of his column on a
double-quick march toward the front in accordion fashion.38
The prairie fire put Carson’s command in a difficult position. It could not outrun
the flames through the thick vegetation on the valley floor and bring out all the men,
horses, and howitzers. To clear the path for his troops and remove the fuel for the
Indians’ fire, Carson ordered the prairie in front of his line fired. This tactic, a counterfire, allowed the command to move forward more quickly. As soon as Carson could, he
steered his column onto the caprock overlooking the Canadian Valley. This repositioning
solved the immediate problem. The caprock grass was too short to provide enough fuel
to make the fire dangerous and too short to obstruct forward progress.39
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Moving to higher ground eliminated the threat from the fire itself, but the Kiowa
and Comanche warriors continued to exploit their fire’s effects. Mounted warriors
zoomed in behind the thin curtain of the advancing prairie fire. Under the cover of the
smoke, they could get close enough to fire a shot without detection and then fade back to
safety. On one occasion, a big gust of wind blew back the smoke exposing a Comanche
warrior who had approached the skirmishers on the left flank, about six or seven yards
from one another. A cavalryman and the Comanche simultaneously raised and fired their
weapons. The Indian missed, and the young Hispanic volunteer shot him off his horse.
Later that evening, the young man sold the Comanche scalp, reportedly the only scalp
taken by the U.S. force that day, to the Ute auxiliaries.40
Plains warriors attempted to use the cover of the fire to mount charges. Whenever
Carson noticed groups massing to make a charge, he ordered artillery fire in that
direction. Pettis’s artillery successfully thwarted any attempts to mount a massed
advance on the rear of the column. His howitzers fired only a few rounds during the
return march toward the upper village. The shells no doubt had a significant
psychological effect. A few rounds were all that was necessary to scatter massing
warriors.41
When Carson’s column got within about five hundred yards of the upper village,
the warriors made one last attempt to draw his command away from it, “acting with more
daring and bravery” than he had ever witnessed. He immediately ordered his howitzers
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into position and called for Pettis to drop shells into the charging Indians. The shells
ended the charge, and Carson turned his attention to the village.42
Kiowas scurried throughout the village, desperately trying to salvage as much as
they could. Pettis dropped two more shells into the village. This, along with a
cooperating charge, drove the remaining occupants to its southern edge. Just before
sundown, the column entered the village. Approximately half the command was detailed
to destroy the lodges, while the other half went to work clearing the remainder of the
village and taking up defensive positions.43
Carson sent Pettis atop a twenty-foot sand hill with his howitzers to aid in the
defense of the column’s new position in the village. Apparently, the sand hill was fairly
steep and not in a completely secure position. The location required an awkward firing
and reloading procedure. According to Pettis, the sand hill…
served as earthworks for the detachment. The pieces were loaded at the
foot of the hill, and at the command of . . . . By hand, to the front . . . . they
were pushed to the top, when the gunner would aim the piece, and at the
command . . . . ready . . . . number four would insert the friction primer,
and lying on his stomach, with no part of this body exposed, would wait
for the command to fire. The piece on being fired would recoil,
sometimes tumbling over and over and at others coming down fairly on
the wheels to the bottom of the hill, when the other piece, having been
loaded meanwhile, would be moved to the top and fired in its turn.44
Skirmishers drove about three dozen remaining Kiowas and Comanches steadily
toward the southern limit of the village, fighting “lodge to lodge” in a tactical precursor
to today’s urban warfare. As the sun sank in the west, these last defenders leapt on their
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mounts and dashed off toward the river. Pettis dropped one more twelve pound shell into
the receding party for good measure, and the long day’s fight finally drew to a close.45
The Kiowa warriors and villagers succeeded in salvaging some of their
possessions from the captured upper village. They regained all their livestock, except
those animals that had been “traded” by the Utes and Jicarillas on the inbound leg of the
day’s journey. They also recovered the women and children who had fled to the breaks
in the caprock near the village, as well as a few white captives that had been taken to that
place.46
That being said, the material loss suffered by the Kiowa residents of the upper
village must have been devastating in the winter season. Carson’s command fired all the
176 finely constructed lodges. They destroyed large supplies of dried meat, berries,
buffalo robes, powder, cooking utensils, and other household items. Soldiers confiscated
several finely dressed buffalo robes for their own use.47
Carson’s soldiers discovered many items confirming that they had indeed
“punished” the intended party. They burned a buggy and a spring wagon, along with
several sets of harnesses. They also found numerous items of women’s and children’s
clothing, several photographs, and a cavalry sergeant’s hat with accompanying belts and
saber that had belonged to a member of the Colorado Volunteers.48
Carson’s men and their horses were exhausted after a long day. The battle had
been far more grueling than anyone had expected. After the destruction of the lodges and
remaining contents was complete, however, Carson ordered his men back into column
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formation. He did not want to risk ending the day with a divided force. Lightly wounded
troopers mounted their horses and rode back to the west. Carson used his two gun
carriages and the two accompanying ammunition carts to transport the more seriously
injured. Cautiously, the column made its way back to the supply wagons. After a three
hour ride from the upper Kiowa village, Carson’s men saw the faint glow of campfires in
the distance.49
Once in camp, most soldiers laid down and went to sleep. Carson posted a double
guard. The men unsaddled the horses, unhitched them from the carts, and set them out on
pickets. In spite of eating nothing all day other than the pork and hardtack, most of the
men did not think of eating before calling it a night.50
Carson anticipated that if the enemy planned to attack his camp, they would do so
just before dawn. He ordered reveille well before first light and posted his troops to
receive an attack. It never came. The entire party – cavalry, artillery, Utes, Jicarillas and
all – devoured a massive prairie breakfast, which depleted their food stores to the point
that they had to send out hunters to restock the commissary wagons. The men gorged on
wild turkey and antelope until it was gone.51
On November 26, Carson moved his force only about five hundred yards to
procure better grass for the animals. With his men and horses exhausted, Carson chose to
rest a day and consider his options. He opted against reengaging the Kiowas and
Comanches. In his report, Carson said he could no longer surprise the Indians, and his
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horses were in no condition to pursue them and their livestock. The aggressiveness and
size of the Comanche-Kiowa force also factored into his decision.52
For most of that day of rest, the Kiowas and Comanches were present on a hill
about two miles distant. Indians from Carson’s party initiated the day’s only excitement,
a nineteenth-century game of chicken. Two of the Indian auxiliaries mounted their
horses and set out at a walk toward the distant Comanches. Two Comanches responded
in kind. A dozen more of the auxiliaries then joined the first two. Again the Comanches
followed suit. This game of brinksmanship continued until as many as two hundred
Indians seemed headed for a meeting on the prairie. Once within about two hundred
yards, someone fired a shot. Several others follows, but the Comanches wheeled and
dashed off in short order, and no other fighting ensued.53
While Carson carefully weighed his options, most of his officers wanted to attack
and destroy the larger villages. The Utes and Jicarillas favored returning. The auxiliaries
were right, and Carson sided with them. Without a stronger, better equipped force and
without fresh horses, the column could accomplish nothing, except to jeopardize its
survival, which had been tenuous on the twenty-fifth.54
Carson and his column began a slow march back toward Fort Bascom. Initially
they moved cautiously, based mostly on Carson’s understanding that they had been
fortunate to have escaped such a large party of plains warriors with no worse losses than
they sustained. As they moved further west, it became apparent that they were no longer
in danger of Kiowa and Comanche retaliation. Carson sent his initial report back to
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headquarters from camp at Rita Blanco on December 4. His party reached Fort Bascom
on December 10.55
Carson’s column lost two soldiers and one Ute killed. Ten soldiers were
wounded, as were five Utes. Some of the wounded soldiers later died. Kiowa and
Comanche losses are more difficult to ascertain. Carson estimated about sixty killed and
wounded. Pettis claims to have met a Comanchero trader three years later who was in the
villages at the time of the attack. This Comanchero informant allegedly told him Indian
losses were 100 killed and between 100 and 150 wounded. In later interviews, Kiowa
participants claimed a loss of just five, although this number may have been just from the
Kiowa upper village. It seems most likely that the true number of Plains Indian casualties
lies some where between the extreme estimates. Army reports often overestimated
Indian casualties, and Indian interviewees nearly always grossly understated their own.56
Whatever their human loss, the Kiowas suffered a great material loss when the
cavalry located and destroyed their upper village. That being said, the Kiowas and
Comanches surely gave Carson’s party a rude awakening. In spite of what he said in his
initial reports about teaching the Indians a severe lesson, Carson clearly stated in later
accounts that he felt quite fortunate that he and his command made it out of the Canadian
Valley alive. Were it not for the mountain howitzers, there may not have been a white
man left to tell the tale.57
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6. The Aftermath
“I Have Taught These Indians a Severe Lesson”
In his initial report, Colonel Carson wrote to General Carleton commending his
troops for their coolness in combat. He certainly thought his force had successfully
prosecuted the mission as he understood it. He wrote, “I flatter myself that I have taught
these Indians a severe lesson, and hereafter they will be more cautious about how they
engage a force of civilized troops.”1
Carleton had only Carson’s report from which to assess the Canadian valley
operation. He had no reason to believe Carson misrepresented his results. He fully
understood that a large force of Kiowas and Comanches remained at large on the
Canadian and that Carson’s party had only managed to destroy the upper village.
Carson’s report indicated his failure to capture the large quantity of Indian livestock held
near the villages. Carson made it clear to Carleton that more work remained to be done.
None of this dampened Carleton’s praise of Carson and the expedition. He expressed
“thanks for the handsome manner in which you all met so formidable an enemy and
defeated him . . . . This brilliant affair adds another green leaf to the laurel wreath which
you have so nobly won in the service of your country.”2
Carson wanted to embark on another, larger expedition as soon as his livestock
recovered. He estimated that time at about six weeks. He believed that if he had a force
of about a thousand troops (he made no mention of auxiliaries), four more guns, and
forage and supplies to camp near Adobe Walls for four months, he could completely
bring the Comanches and Kiowas to U.S. terms. Carson knew that he had not decisively
1
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defeated the Indians, otherwise another such campaign would not have been necessary.
He also learned after the campaign that Indians held several white captives in the
villages. Carson always felt honor-bound to liberate captives; so this knowledge likely
influenced his desire to lead a follow-up mission.3
Carleton understood that he had not solved the problem of potential raiding on the
Santa Fe Trail, but his department lacked the resources to undertake the operation Carson
proposed. As he did the previous summer, Carleton requested aid from the Department
of the Missouri. He suggested that Major General Curtis strengthen his garrisons at Forts
Atkinson and Larned and place a semipermanent camp in the Palo Duro area. The latter
would function as a base from which they could readily punish hostiles the following
summer when traffic on the trail – and the corresponding raids – increased. Carleton
believed that he could protect the trail from his department to the Arkansas Crossing but
that he could not guard Bosque Redondo, protect the Santa Fe Trail, and prosecute
campaigns against hostile Indians with the manpower at his disposal.4
Major General Grenville M. Dodge succeeded Curtis as departmental commander
after the Atlanta campaign in the East. Upon receiving Carleton’s request, he expressed
his desire to cooperate with Carleton to protect the Santa Fe Trail. He took immediate
action to bolster his posts along the route. The two attempted to set up a system by which
Carleton’s command escorted trains between Forts Union and Larned, and Dodge’s
command escorted travelers between Larned and Council Grove (about twenty-five miles
south of present Manhattan, Kansas). Trains embarked twice a month, and deviations
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from these sanctioned, escorted parties were prohibited. Dodge initiated no direct action
against the Kiowas or Comanches by sending an expedition to the Palo Duro, however.5
General Carleton initially found reason to hope his punitive mission had pressured
the Comanches to sue for peace. A Comanche named “Sheer-ke-na-kwaugh” visited Fort
Bascom in mid-January claming to be the head chief of the Comanches. The commander
at Bascom, Major Bergmann, believed that he had honest intentions. The visiting
Comanche promised peace and even offered to provide any information he could attain
about planned Kiowa and Kiowa-Apache raids. Bergmann told him that only Carleton
could make that peace and suggested that he wait at Bascom until Carleton arrived.
Sheer-ke-na-kwaugh would not wait but promised to return at the “last quarter of the
moon.” Carleton was quite pleased at the prospect but still skeptical. He made plans to
attend the meeting at Bascom and asked Carson to accompany him. Relations with the
Comanches appeared headed in the right direction, apparently as a direct result of the
Adobe Walls campaign.6
“Our Troops Were Badly Whipped”
Not everyone offered such a sanguine evaluation of Carson’s campaign. A string
of articles and letters criticizing the affair appeared in the Santa Fe New Mexican.
Although the writers made every attempt to avoid criticism of Carson and the
expedition’s participants, they published reports that milked every possible negative
connotation from available battle reports and laid the blame squarely upon General
Carleton. They cited several reasonable arguments in calling the affair a defeat: failure
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of Carson’s command to make off with any livestock, the fact that the Indians were left in
possession of the field of battle, and lack of evidence to support federal estimates of
Kiowa and Comanche casualties. Their overall assessment was “that our troops were
badly whipped” and that the whole operation had been ill-advised and completely
unnecessary in the first place.7
The newspaper business in Santa Fe was a highly politicized enterprise during
Carleton’s tenure as departmental commander. Two competing papers, the New Mexican
and the Gazette, traded barbs on just about every issue. The Gazette supported Carleton
and published favorable accounts of his doings at Bosque Redondo, of the Adobe Walls
campaign, and of just about everything else. The New Mexican portrayed Carleton as
something just short of Attila the Hun. Carleton could do nothing right in the New
Mexican, and the New Mexican consistently castigated the Gazette for being Carleton’s
mouthpiece. The New Mexican referred to the Gazette as “the ‘Carletonian Gazette,’”
“the translator for Head Quarters,” and “the Carletonian.” Neither the New Mexican nor
the Gazette bothered with publishing sober assessments. The latter half of the Gazette’s
motto says everything: “Independent in all Things, Neutral in Nothing.”8
Political ambitions clouded credibility in this argument over whether the
campaign was a “victory,” successful, or necessary. For all the reasons stated in the first
chapter, Michael Steck and his allies wanted the campaign perceived as a failure. They
pointed out the fact that Carleton had exerted power over Indian affairs to shut down the
lucrative Comanchero trade by disallowing all passes issued by Superintendent Steck.
He did this under the guise of a war against the Comanches. Subsequently, Carleton
7
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allowed some traders to pass but only with his personal endorsement. The anti-Carleton
party claimed that he was using his military authority to create a trading monopoly for his
favorites and associates. They sought to portray the Carson campaign as just another
Carleton power grab at best. At worst, it was an impending disaster to residents of the
territory’s eastern frontier who might face reprisals from angry Comanches and Kiowas. 9
Carleton and his allies needed to show that the campaign had been a success in
order to retain credibility, and garner support for the candidate for territorial governor
endorsed by Carleton and his allies at the Gazette. Further, Carleton remained under
heavy criticism throughout his tenure as departmental commander, and could use public
support wherever and however he could get it. The pro-Carleton party was more than
willing to point to the Sheer-kee-na-kwaugh visit as evidence that the Adobe Walls
campaign had made the Indians “feel the white man’s power” and had pressured them
into accepting peace on terms favorable to the United States.10
The Comanche Peace
Unfortunately, the meeting between Carleton, Carson, and Sheer-kee-na-kwaugh
never materialized. The man who purported to be “head chief” of the Comanches
disappeared from both the Department of New Mexico and the historical record. This
brought great delight to Carleton’s opponents – not that they wanted to face Comanche
reprisals, but as evidence of Carleton’s failure and incompetence. “Where is Sheer-keena-kwaugh and his peace makers?” taunted the New Mexican.11
Sheer-kee-na-kwaugh’s disappearance foreshadowed approaching troubles. One
of the traders Carleton allowed onto the plains in the spring of 1865 was Arthur
9
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Morrison, who had been an aide to Carleton during his time in the army. Comanches
accosted Morrison’s Nuevo Mexicano scouts, stealing their saddles and firearms.
Morrison encountered another Nuevo Mexicano trading party that had been endorsed by
Carleton. Comanches had stolen all of their trading goods and threatened them with
death, should they return. Morrison considered himself lucky not to have lost his trading
stake and fled the plains.12
Morrison brought bad news for Union forces. The Comanches and Kiowas had
joined forces with a dozen more tribes across the Southern Plains and Indian Territory in
an alliance with the Confederates. They said the Confederates promised them food,
clothing, and ammunition in return for their cooperation in a general strike against New
Mexico. Nuevo Mexicanos, who had been safe on the plains for decades due to their
favorable trade relationship, were now also in danger when attempting to trade on the
Llano Estacado. A large portion of Carson’s force at Adobe Walls had been Hispanic.
The Kiowas and Comanches recognized this and now considered their former trade
partners enemies.13
May of 1865 was a bad time to make deals with Confederates. Bereft of aid from
the Confederates and now estranged from their former New Mexico allies, the Kiowas
and Comanches signed the Little Arkansas Treaty in October 1865. This treaty, like most
others, proved ineffective within a year. The U.S. reached another agreement in 1867,
the Medicine Lodge Treaty. It, too, brought only a temporary peace. In the long run,
12
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only military conquest of the Comanches and Kiowas in the Red River War of 1874 and
1875 finally brought peace to Comanchería’s neighbors.14
Michael Steck
Although the Adobe Walls campaign may not have been militarily decisive,
Carleton thought that he might walk away from the affair with a different kind of victory.
He believed he had the necessary evidence to rid himself and the territory of
Superintendent Steck. Steck ardently opposed almost every initiative Carleton undertook
involving Indians. The two had long standing feuds over Carleton’s administration of
martial law in the territory in general, the Bosque Redondo affair, Carleton’s launching of
the Adobe Walls campaign, and his use of Ute and Jicarilla auxiliaries without consulting
Steck, to name a few.15
Steck was not alone in opposing Carleton’s administration of martial law. Steck,
however, held a high enough position occasionally to stand in Carleton’s way. Once
Carleton knew he would prosecute a campaign on the plains in 1864, he attempted to shut
down the Comanchero trade to prevent the Kiowas and Comanches from receiving
advance notification of Carson’s arrival. He also, of course, wanted to prevent
Comancheros from supplying the Indians with ammunition and supplies they would later
use against his force. Carleton asked Governor Connelly to cease granting trade permits
and ordered his detachment at Fort Bascom to halt any trading parties bound for
Comanchería. Connelly agreed to the restriction.16
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Steck disregarded Carleton’s request and Connelly’s policy. He continued to
issue the passes. The Fort Bascom command was ineffective in stopping the traders but
did confiscate passes from several traders on their return trip. Steck had signed the
passes after Carleton’s decision to prosecute the campaign. Carleton and Carson were
livid. They were certain that their men had been killed and wounded by ammunition
Comancheros had provided the Comanches in the days just prior to the assault. They
directed the force of their anger not at the traders but at Michael Steck – understandably
so, considering the personal history between the two, and the signatures on the passes.17
Carleton figured that he finally had the evidence he needed to get rid of Steck
once and for all. He wrote a letter to the adjutant general of the army, Brigadier General
Lorenzo Thomas, which included several supporting documents. His letter lamented the
difficulty of prosecuting hostile Indians while other governmental agencies appeared to
be aiding and abetting them. Carleton wrote:
The military is doing its best to protect the people and the lines of
communication from the hostile Indians; but when a high civil functionary
gives passports to men to carry on a nefarious traffic, when he knows in
reason that those men will give information of the movements of the
troops; and when he sits down and deliberately writes to the Governor that
he has not given such passports, you must know, General, that such
conduct adds not a little, to say the least, to our many embarrassments.18
Carleton’s efforts were ultimately successful. The commissioner of Indian affairs
asked Steck to resign “for the good of the service” on March 18, 1865.19
Carleton Follows
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The removal of Steck as superintendent of Indian affairs in New Mexico may
have seemed like a great victory for General Carleton. However, he would have little
time to gloat. Steck was only one of a sizable contingent of politicians in Santa Fe who
despised Carleton and wanted him out. They resented Carleton’s rigid enforcement of
martial law and his seemingly arbitrary enforcement of his own edicts. They determined
that most of Carleton’s decisions had the aim of personal empire building.20
Bosque Redondo fell squarely in the center of the debate. Steck’s allies in Santa
Fe vehemently opposed Bosque Redondo, but not because they saw it as some kind of
inhumane experiment. They argued that it left the hated Navajos far too close to settled
New Mexico. The costs of the operation were exorbitant and amounted to favors
Carleton could use in building his personal empire. They additionally argued that such
large government purchases drove the prices up on items they needed for daily existence.
Carleton’s expedition against the Comanches only added fuel to the fire. Some of his
enemies believed the whole affair was just an excuse to build another Bosque Redondo
and pilfer even more government funding to distribute among his “cronies.”21
On July 4, 1865, Carleton attempted to quell the anger against him in Santa Fe.
He felt safe abolishing martial law now that the Civil War was over. In his rescinsion
declaration, he concluded with a conciliatory passage apparently aimed at mending
fences. The damage was done by now, however. Anti-Carleton forces in Santa Fe
undertook a letter-writing campaign demanding an investigation into Bosque Redondo
specifically and the Carleton regime generally.22
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Although no investigation followed, words consistently flowed back to
Washington complaining of Carleton’s administration of military affairs in New Mexico.
On October 6, 1866, the war department removed Carleton from command and
reassigned him as a lieutenant colonel in the Fourth Cavalry, headquartered in San
Antonio, Texas. Whether he was reassigned merely as part of the postwar army
reorganization, the Doolittle Commissions findings on the Bosque Redondo affair, or
consistent pressure from New Mexicans, is unclear.23
One thing was certain. Carleton’s career was effectively over. He was never
again promoted, nor did he receive any other important assignment. He remained in San
Antonio until pneumonia claimed his life on 7 January 1873.24
Kit Carson’s Last Fight
Kit Carson did not share the fate suffered by General Carleton or Superintendent
Steck. It may seem strange that his last and largest Indian fight is largely forgotten. That
may be in part because many perceive it as a defeat. Carson did not see the fight that
way. He knew that getting his men out of such a dangerous situation was victory
enough.25
Carson remained a devoted Carleton disciple as long as the latter remained in
command in New Mexico. Carleton was delighted to know that his trusted field
commander would remain in the service of the country throughout his tenure in the
territory. Carleton allowed Carson a few months’ respite at home – something Carson
consistently longed for at this stage of his life. Shortly thereafter, Carleton called Carson
back to duty as part of his cooperative endeavor with the Department of the Missouri to
Gibson, James H. Carleton, 72; Hunt, Frontier Dragoon, 344; Kane, “James H. Carleton,” 141-142.
Gibson, James H. Carleton, 72, 75.
25
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protect Santa Fe Trail traffic from Comanche and Kiowa retaliation. On May 20, 1865,
Carson led a contingent to Cold Spring, at the extreme western edge of “no-man’s land.”
There he set up camp on a high bluff overlooking a segment of the Cimarron Cut-Off and
watched for trouble. There was none. Adobe Walls was indeed Kit Carson’s last fight.26
General Carleton’s Adobe Walls campaign was militarily indecisive. It
contributed to the demise of both Carleton and his principle political opponent Michael
Steck. Many consider the battle a loss that might damage the record of Carson, an
otherwise great frontiersman. These factors may be reasons why the 1864 Adobe Walls
campaign has been largely forgotten.
The rancorous New Mexico politics that surrounded Carleton and the Adobe
Walls campaign obstructed what would have been a difficult mission under the best of
circumstances. As it turned out, the near term results of the campaign not only killed the
careers of two prominent leaders, but did not yield significant results. But it was Adobe
Walls’ place in the larger context of the wars with the Comanches and Kiowas and other
Plains tribes (discussed in the next chapter) that marked the battle’s importance.
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7. Conclusion
The Forgotten Campaign
Die hard aficionados of Western history may have heard of Adobe Walls. If so,
they probably remember the 1874 battle between the hide hunters and Comanches
featuring Bat Masterson, Quanah Parker, and Billy Dixon’s famous shot. The PanhandlePlains Historical Museum – one of the finest regional museums in the country and the
most prolific historical interpreter in the area – does not even differentiate between the
1864 and 1874 battles in its archive. If it has a document referring to Adobe Walls, it
assumes that material pertains to the hide hunters’ fight.
How could the 1874 Adobe Walls Fight, a relatively minor skirmish, dwarf Kit
Carson’s campaign in regional memory? Perhaps an explanation can be found in
contemporary context. The 1864 campaign took place in the midst of the Civil War. It
was certainly not the largest, best known, or even most important battle in 1864 – a year
during which the Atlanta campaign, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg were fought.
Maybe Adobe Walls fails to live up to the American frontier myth. From our
twenty-first-century perspective, it is difficult to look positively at a cavalry force riding
in to assault Indian villages. We see villages as the peaceful residences of families –
which they no doubt often were. But they were also the only place the army could find
the warriors conducting the damaging raids. Army leaders believed Indians had to be
fought where they could be found, and that was during the winter in villages. Regardless
of the absence of alternatives for prosecuting Plains Indians, the story is not so well
received in America today.
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Most likely, historians neglect the 1864 Adobe Walls campaign because they do
not know what to do with the fight. The campaign was indecisive. Nineteenth-century
American Indian War battles and campaigns almost always were inconclusive, primarily
due to the nature of the fighting and Indian tactics. Like Major Ruff’s fruitless scout in
1860, or Kirby Smith’s hunt for Sanico, campaigns against the Plains tribes so often
netted the army only frustration and wasted energy. 1 When the American military
achieved success on the plains, it came through persistence and destruction rather than a
decisive Napoleonic battle.2 When Indian Wars battles were decisive, the decision often
favored Indians as at Pine Creek (1858) and Little Bighorn (1876) since they seldom
fought toe-to-toe without some significant advantage.3
Many historians – and Americans in general – prefer to make definitive
statements about historical events. We call battles either victories or defeats and
campaigns success or failures. Most interpreters of Adobe Walls either speak of success
or failure in guarded, cautious terms, or call the mission an outright military defeat. 4
Decisive, watershed moments in history such as Gettysburg, Waterloo, or the use of the
first atomic bomb at Hiroshima make for sharper studies, and provide far easier subjects
on which we can definitively comment.
Was the 1864 Adobe Walls Campaign a Success or a Failure?
In many ways, the Battle of Adobe Walls feels like a U.S. failure. The classic
measurement of military success – possession of the field of battle – points to a Kiowa
1

Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, 89-90; Ruff to Maury, 30 July 1860, R/21 LR, 1860, DNM, r. 12,
M1120, RG 393, NA.
2
Dunlay, Kit Carson & the Indians, 339.
3
Wallace and Hoebel, The Comanches, 257.
4
Rathjen, The Texas Panhandle Frontier, 80; Utley, Kit Carson and the Adobe Walls Campaign, 4; Utley,
Frontiersmen in Blue, 299; Kenner, The Comanchero Frontier, 148-150; Dunlay, Kit Carson & the
Indians, 334-337; Nye, Carbine & Lance, 37; Nye, Bad Medicine & Good, xv; Sabin, Kit Carson Days,
746-748; Mayhall, The Kiowas, 232; Wallace and Hoebel, The Comanches, 306.

112

and Comanche victory. Though that relic of Napoleonic warfare could not successfully
measure the success of a battle with Indians for the reasons stated in chapter four, many
contemporaries viewed the battle as a defeat on those grounds. At the time, Carson’s
officers seem to have been of the same opinion. They argued in favor of continuing the
fight in spite of Carson’s experience and their obvious numerical disadvantage.5
Carson’s later admission that if not for some adept artillery fire, “few would have
been left to tell the tale,” also suggests failure. Such scrapes do not occur in decisive
victories. Many contemporaries pointed to Carson’s failure to retain and confiscate
captured Indian livestock as evidence of failure. Carson clearly regretted missing the
opportunity to liberate several white captives in the villages at the time of his attack.
Despite General Carleton’s best efforts, the Mescalero Apaches and Navajos at Bosque
Redondo could not be convinced to join the expedition.6
If Carleton intended the punitive aspect of the mission to prevent future raiding
along the Santa Fe Trail, that seems to have failed as well. Sporadic raiding continued
throughout the spring and summer of 1865. Since revenge played a central role in the
military cult that inspired Plains Indian raiding and war, such punitive campaigns – when
not decisive – did more to trigger an increase in future raids than to cow Indians into
submission. The campaign did not stop raids, nor did it prevent large expenditures of
manpower drawn from two departments the following spring to protect Santa Fe Trail
travel and commerce.7
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On the other hand, Carson destroyed well over 150 Kiowa lodges, and huge stores
of winter foodstuffs. Surely they felt the sting of that loss, particularly since it came at
the onset of winter. Carson and Carleton also successfully prevented the pan-Indian
uprising that they had feared in light of Robert North’s report of the previous summer.
The most significant success of the campaign may have been a psychological victory.
For good reason, the Comanches and Kiowas saw the Llano Estacado as an almost
impenetrable barrier protecting them from hostile foreigners. The Adobe Walls
campaign showed that their winter abodes were no longer safe havens, even on the most
remote stretches of the Canadian River.8
On the surface, the evidence conflicts as to whether or not Adobe Walls should be
considered a successful campaign, with perhaps a preponderance of evidence appearing
to suggest failure. It would, however, be remiss to attempt to evaluate any military
operation without considering its commander’s intent. Carleton did not post a list of
objectives from which pundits or historians might judge his success. His correspondence,
though, does specifically state some of the objectives he brought to this campaign.
Carleton’s stated objectives change a bit depending on whom he was addressing
and when. In September correspondence to Carson and when giving instructions as to
how Carson’s party would be outfitted, Carleton emphasized the campaign’s limited
resources and limited objectives. He also highlighted the importance of bringing the Utes
into the conflict on the U.S. side. He wanted to reduce the likelihood that the Utes would
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“join in any league which the (Plains) Indians may attempt to make for a general war by
all the Indians between the mountains and the Missouri on the whites.”9
Carleton clearly had designs on a more significant campaign, though, if adequate
forces were available. In October, he urged Curtis to send a large force from Kansas “so
as to make this the last war that will be necessary to prosecute against these two, the most
treacherous tribes of the plains.”10
With a large force at his disposal or not, Carleton clearly intended the mission to
be punitive. His General Orders No. 32, which officially committed manpower and
resources from his department to the expedition, emphasized its punitive nature as an
intended means of preventing Santa Fe Trail depredations the following spring and
summer. The orders were dated October 22, 1864. The same day, he told Blunt that he
wanted to strike a blow “which these two treacherous tribes will remember.”11
In some of his final instructions to Carson before the column embarked on the
mission, Carleton made his wishes simple: “It is my desire that you give those Indians,
especially the Kiowas, a severe drubbing.” He articulated clearly that women and
children were to be spared, while acknowledging that a few noncombatant casualties
were likely when Carson’s force struck.12
Carleton clearly failed to make this the “last war necessary” against the Kiowas
and Comanches. But that objective had been based on having a larger force of
converging columns. With the limited resources at hand, Carleton focused on bringing in
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the Utes and impressing on the Plains tribes that their raiding would trigger U.S.
retaliation. Carleton implicitly trusted Carson’s ability to relate with Indians, and for
good reason. Carson was completely successful in incorporating the Utes and Jicarillas,
thus preventing them from joining a larger Indian movement.13
Carson was unable to give the Kiowas and Comanches the “severe drubbing”
Carleton would have liked, but he did strike a blow “which these two . . . . tribes will
remember.” Carson was fairly successful in destroying Kiowa lodges and winter
resources. However, “punishment” was likely an ill-advised objective in the first place.
Carleton and Carson may not have realized it at the time, but the psychological “blow” of
challenging winter homeland security was probably the biggest near-term success of the
campaign. The knowledge that the army could strike them anywhere in any season
would have a lingering effect.
For the Kiowas, the implications were even greater. The Comanches had battled
whites from Texas and the United States since Texas was Mexican territory. Adobe
Walls was the first major military campaign against the Kiowas. It was literally the
beginning of the end for them and their traditional way of life.
Remembering the 1864 Adobe Walls Campaign
The 1864 Adobe Walls campaign of 1864 should be remembered for several
reasons. The battle itself was one of a very small number of clear, pitched battles in the
North American Indian Wars. The list is short – Cieneguilla (1854), Pine Creek, (1858),

13

It seems unlikely based on inter-tribal relationships and alliances that the Utes and Jicarillas could have
been brought into an alliance with the Kiowas and Apaches in the first place, but it is not beyond the realm
of possibility. Some kind of large council took place between over a dozen tribes and the Confederate
government. Leavenworth to Ford, 30 May 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt.2, p. 687-688; Adair to Veatch, 20
July 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1102-1103; Kenner, The Comanchero Frontier, 153-4; Smith to
Pike, 8 April 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1266-1269; Cooper to Throckmorton, 16 May 1865, OR,
ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1309.

116

Four Lakes (1858), Fort Defiance, (1860), Little Bighorn (1876), Adobe Walls – there
just were not very many. And even among those, Adobe Walls was numerically one of
the largest Indian War battles in American history, perhaps second only to Little Bighorn.
That fact alone argues for the battle’s importance.
Kit Carson’s involvement also deserves attention. Adobe Walls was his last fight,
but it is significant in his life for more reasons. In Carson’s long experience on the
frontier, he interacted with Indians in numerous ways, including fighting them. His
understanding of Indian fighting allowed him to recognize the danger his command was
in at Adobe Walls and avoid disaster. Even after he decided to move his force back
toward the supply train, Carson’s quick and creative tactical responses managing his
formations and countering “fire with fire” – not just with howitzers – gave his men a safe
return to New Mexico. Heroism is often measured in clear triumphs, and success in
multitude and magnitude of victories. Adobe Walls shows Carson’s heroism in his
ability to make an unpopular decision that salvaged the best possible results from an
unfavorable situation.
On a larger scale, the Adobe Walls campaign illustrates several elements of U.S.
military action against Plains Indians that eventually became the army’s formula for
defeating them: destruction of resources, winter campaigning, and the development of
converging columns.
Destruction of Indian resources was not new to Indian warfare. It was a strategy
borrowed from the Indians themselves and used by Angloamericans against Indians as
early as the colonial wars. Union forces were in the process of using similar tactical
applications of total war against the Confederates the same year Carson and Carleton
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prosecuted the Adobe Walls campaign. Carleton effectively used violence and
destruction in an environment – the nineteenth-century American West – where those
were often the only language spoken and respected.14 Carleton and Carson used the
method with brutal effectiveness against the Navajos in 1863, and incorporated it in their
plans for the Kiowas and Comanches the following year. It was a bit more difficult to
implement against the Plains tribes, which lacked the sedentary agriculture and large
pastoral herds maintained by the Navajos. U.S. forces instead sacked caches of food and
supplies the Kiowas had stored for the winter and destroyed lodges, exemplifying a tactic
that would be used repeatedly in warfare against the Plains tribes. The army supported a
similar concept and applied it more effectively in the mid to late 1870s when white
Americans hastened the demise of the plains tribes’ most important resource – the great
buffalo herds.15
Carleton had initiated his operation against the Navajos in the summer of 1863.
The acute shortage of resources that forced the Navajos to surrender, however, became
readily apparent in the winter. Resources available to western Indian tribes were nearly
always most scarce that time of year. Furthermore, winter weather particularly limited
the Plains tribes’ mobility – one of their greatest advantages. Carleton did not originally
intend his campaign against the Kiowas and Comanches to be a winter campaign, but by
the time Carson launched his men down the Canadian valley, winter weather was at hand.
Adobe Walls proved that winter greatly aided U.S. troops in locating large, stationary
groups of Plains Indians. It turned out to be in essence a “proof of concept” for winter
campaigning on the plains. This concept of winter campaigning played a crucial role in
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later expeditions against Plains Indians. It was decisive against the Cheyennes in the
1868 Washita campaign.
Carleton never successfully elicited support from other departments for his Kiowa
and Comanche campaign. This was not for lack of trying. His concept called for
columns to converge from Kansas and New Mexico. Each column was to be large
enough not to be vulnerable alone to raids. This multitude of large army forces would
negate some of the mobility disadvantages on the plains, and create the appearance that
federal armies were everywhere in the Indians’ home land and could not be avoided.
Although Carleton could not see this plan through to fruition due to other taxes on
military manpower in Kansas and Missouri, this very strategy met success in the Washita
campaign and ultimately brought the Comanches, Kiowas and Cheyennes to their knees.
In the Red River War of 1874-1875, Major General Phil Sheridan devised a plan in which
five columns converged from Forts Concho, Griffin, Sill, Bascom, and Dodge onto the
Comanche stronghold – the Llano Estacado. The columns destroyed villages and horse
herds as they found them. Within a year, the last hold outs surrendered.16
Adobe Walls shows the inherent messiness of warfare against the Plains Indians,
and its divergence from traditional conceptions of warfare in which two armies place
units on a battlefield and match strength against strength, intent on destroying the
opposing force with decisive offensive strokes and flanking maneuvers. Adobe Walls
shows how elements of Indian strategy were being progressively incorporated into U.S.
war strategy, a trend that would continue through the world wars. It shows how heroism
cannot be defined in “winning.” And most of all, Adobe Walls directly shows the
essential strategic components that would later be used to conclude Indian conflicts in the
16
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United States’s favor during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This massive Battle
of Adobe Walls fought in 1864 truly does deserve a more prominent place in American
history.
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